Text of Public Lecture delivered under the auspices of the Institute for Governance and Development (IGD), Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Edo State of Nigeria, October 2, 2002.
It is a great pleasure to be here today. For me, I am home and among friends and relatives. My direct and indirect association with this great institution dates back to the early 1980s. I am quite pleased to note that many of my associates, comrades and friends in the early days when things were really tough on ground, have weathered the storm and remained with this institution. I commend them for the courage and commitment they have demonstrated. Let me also commend the administration of the university under the able leadership of Professor Dennis Agbonlahor for facing the challenges of institution building and consolidation squarely. The vice-chancellor stood his ground in the face of all odds and today we see a credible, stable and cultured academic institution steadily emerging from the crises and uncertainties of the past. I am also aware of the unflinching commitment of the Chief Lucky Igbinedion government to this university. His Excellency and I have held several discussions on new ways to ensure university autonomy, strengthen academic and other programs, internationalize the institution, and increase funding from public and other sources. It is my hope that our discussions would soon be translated into increased support for the institution. To our brand new full professor, Friday Iyoha whom I have known since our days as students of Edo Boys High School (now Adolor College) in Ugbowo, I say thank you for taking on the task of serving as pioneer director of the Institute for Governance and Development. As always, you can count on my total support to ensure the success of the institute and the university at large.
Our discussion today would focus on the new politics of constitutionalism and democratization in Africa and Nigeria. While my focus would be on Nigeria, I would draw lessons from other African states. Critical aspects of our discussion would focus on the nature, character and politics of the Nigerian ruling class though one could legitimately ask: Is the so-called ruling class actually ruling? Or is it just governing? We would focus also on the nature and composition and character of the Nigerian state. Our dialectical understanding of the politics of state and class would provide the context for understanding why the new constitutionalism is important on the democratic enterprise. If I spend quite some time in explaining the background, identifying the challenges, crises and contradictions, and emphasizing the dimensions of the struggle, it only because most Nigerians have only a pedestrian and superficial understanding of the specificities of our national predicaments, the content and context of our realities, and the actors responsible for the reproduction of our national misfortunes.
Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to betray my bias right up front by stating that in spite of the nature and potentials of the new politics, Africa and Nigeria remain in deep trouble. As Nigerians, I do not really need to explain this any further: the poverty, arrogance, violence, assassinations, hunger, marginalization, corruption and poverty around us are clear indicators of the fact that all is not well in our country. The postcolonial state and the African power elite have consistently designed dubious and opportunistic strategies to depoliticize, marginalize and render powerless the vast majority of the people when it came to redefining the content and context of politics, setting new rules to guide political action, and reformatting political institutions and political power. The process and politics of constitution making, for example, have always been elitist, opportunistic, insensitive, top-down, elite-driven, non-consultative and non-participatory. The processes of constitution making, if they could be so described, were never designed to support a larger agenda of genuine political reconstruction. Constitution making was seen more as opportunities or strategies to consolidating existing political relations, strengthening the power of the elites, and ensuring the survival of the repressive, exploitative and violent post-colonial state. Constitution making was never seen as opportunities for addressing the national question and dealing with those difficult and ever widening fault-lines that had tasked the survival of the state in Africa. These deficiencies pose major challenges to the task of state reconstruction, nation building, democratization, development and peace. But African politics has not been stagnant. Let us briefly examine the changing nature of politics in Africa.
The Changing Political Landscape in Africa
The first two decades of political independence in Africa witnessed the containment of the robust enthusiasm for freedom that had informed the popular challenges to colonial domination. The new power elite simply Africanized or indigenized the exploitative, repressive, and arrogant appropriation and deployment of power that had been the tradition of the colonial state. This often required the containment of the media, the marginalization of rural areas, the harassment of political opponents, and the subversion of the constitution. Within two decades of political independence therefore, the continent was littered with coups and counter-coups, ethnic violence, agitations for autonomy, alienation from the state and its custodians, and the withdrawal of support for public policies. As political decay, uncertainly, violence, and disillusionment replaced the euphoria of Uhuru, even fractions of the power elite began to construct parallel structures of power and opportunities. This was evidenced in the use of foreign schools for the wards, reliance on foreign hospitals for medical attention, use of foreign banks to stash away looted public funds; foreign airlines as against national carriers; and foreign advisers rather than well qualified and experienced indigenes. The post-colonial elite also relied on the use of private security in place of public police, private water bore-holes and private electricity generators in place of publicly provided alternatives, and investments abroad rather than in the local economy. Members of the African elite shamelessly and arrogantly bragged about their houses and investments abroad, the number and balances in their foreign bank accounts, and the number of their children in foreign private colleges.
The postcolonial state was privatized and used only as an instrument for rapid primitive accumulation and its instruments of coercion deployed to settle private disagreements and the control of power by political despots. The self-styled “teachers”, “Lions”, Rainmakers”, “Fathers”, and “Killer of Elephants”, “warriors” and “Visionaries” compromised and subverted the revolutionary ideologies and processes that had informed the anti-colonial struggles: the evidence of their shameless performances in office are there for all to see today. Coupled with economic mismanagement, rabid corruption, irresponsible political behavior and squandermania, the near abandonment of the state by its very custodians weakened it and made it largely irrelevant to the daily lives of the people. The state was now seen and treated as enemy by the people, a force that was to be avoided, hated, attacked, and subverted as opportunity permitted. Such a state had no room for the development, rule of law, social justice, human rights, and constitutionalism. All these were sacrificed on the alter of political expediency, political rascality, the hunger for raw power, and the arrogance of a political elite with only a tenuous relationship to real production. One of the major consequences of this retreat into political atavism was that constitutions became useless documents that meant nothing to how power was defined, perceived, appropriated, and deployed. Arbitrary rule and the wanton deployment of violence took over and there was no difference between Nigeria and Ghana under the military on the one hand and Kenya, Cameroon or Zambia under so-called civilian rule. Within two decades Africa became the sick baby of the world with more refugees, civil wars, maniacal leaders, economic crises and poverty stricken people than any other region. Leaders went from one foreign capital to the other, cap in hand, tears in their eyes, shamelessly making pleas for foreign aid. One West African country even accepted money in exchange for toxic wastes to be dumped on its shores!
More than ever before, there is a new energy and popular interest in democratic governance in contemporary Africa. For a continent that was awash with brutal dictators, corrupt regimes, misplaced priorities, institutional decay, and social dislocation and violence, the recent political openings and renewed commitments to democratic values present new opportunities and possibilities. True, there is much to worry about in the illiberal democratic realities of the continent. In fact, most of the newly elected politicians still act and sound very much like the dictators of the past. They appear impatient with democracy and perceive democratic rules as impediments to their ability to use power as they see fit. They express shallow and opportunistic commitments to democratic practice and are all too willing to subvert democratic institutions at the slightest opportunity. Even the so-called new breed leaders- Eritrea, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia- have disappointed observers and their citizens with the ease with which they degenerated into corruption, harassment of opponents, manipulation of civil society, closure or abridgement of democratic spaces, war and intolerance for criticisms. The arrogance of power stinks to the skies and their disinterest in development and the liberation of the people continues to expose their shallowness and opportunism.
This not withstanding, the emergence of new issues, new discourses, new leaders, and new political parties on the continent’s political landscape has altered the balance of forces and encouraged a radical realignment of political interests. Irrespective of the particular country concerned, there are certain common variables that are shaping the content and context of contemporary politics in Africa: the end of the cold war; donor complaints about aid fatigue; the end of apartheid and the emergence of South Africa as a central player in continental politics; the increasing unpopularity of military juntas; the increasing influence and power of civil society groups and the emergence of a new breed of articulate and pro-democracy leaders. To these, we can add the new commitment of international organizations and Western governments to the new democratic agenda; the new recognition of the centrality of pluralism, gender, identity and nationality issues in the articulation of political platforms; and the political impact of globalization requiring at the minimum democratic practices, respect for human rights, and multiparty political arrangements. Africa, in spite of its dependence, underdevelopment, and marginalization in the global divisions of labor and power has not been spared the impact of these developments.
Today, the political picture on the continent, though not quite clear, is radically different from what it used to be a decade or more ago because the political environment, the issues and the actors have changed dramatically. What are some of the indicators of this change?
Though it is still a very long and painful way to the promise land of democracy and good governance, even the old buzzards of African politics have, at the very least, changed the language and style of their political activities. There is a new movement towards consultation and legitimizing power through the will of the people. Even in Nigeria, autocrats and unreformed despots that once sang the praises of maniacal dictators to the high heavens now talk of democracy, fair play, the rule of law, even human rights.
The contestation for hegemony or control of the state is no longer dominated by the tiny class of elites. New leaders, new constituencies, and new political parties now litter the political field of all African states.
It is no longer fashionable to develop a guerilla army and engage the state over disagreements on political reforms just as coups are becoming increasingly unacceptable to the larger society. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and other hot spots, there is a clear effort to negotiate, dialogue, build new political bridges, and terminate festering conflicts.
In many African states, the political fraction of the power elite not only feels terribly embarrassed at its shameful performance on all fronts but it is also on the retreat even if temporarily. Its poor performance in governance and economic development since the 1960s has eroded its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This has to some extent mediated the traditional arrogance of power and humbled some of the so-called leaders. Hence in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, and even Kenya and Uganda, opposition elements are making great strides as the electorate continues to punish the old buzzards of politics by voting for “new blood.”
Rabid populism, intimidation of civil society and political opponents, and the manipulation of primordial loyalties are no longer sufficient to buy or guarantee the support of the people. It is not amazing therefore, that the conservative custodians of state power have had no problems with conceding their failures and inviting or incorporating credible opposition elements into existing power structures to give a veneer of legitimacy or political rebirth. Even military juntas have had to make a hasty retreat from power as was the case in General Abdulsalam Abubakar’s junta in Nigeria. General Sani Abacha’s rule had thoroughly delegitimated the military and aroused a robust civil society opposition to continued military rule.
Women, rural folk, the youth and workers are increasingly re-entering the center stage of politics all over Africa. The process is slow but it is certainly going on. In Nigeria, there are on-going discussions on how to establish a viable opposition, possibly labour-led party. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, the trade unions were in the leadership of the reform movement. In Ghana, students were very central to the defeat of Jerry Rawlings’ party the NDC. In Malawi, the church teamed up with opposition forces to dismantle Banda’s discredited one-person dictatorship. In Senegal, Abdou Diouf conceded defeat to Abdoulaye Wade in the March 2000 election as soon as he saw the monumental shift engineered by the active participation of young persons who were dissatisfied with the status quo. In Uganda, young people also constitute the core of the “multipartysts.” In spite of Yoweri Museveni’s efforts and promises, supporters of multiparty politics won the mayoral election in Kampala in the February 2002 election.
In place of the one-party or no party state, we now have a plethora of political parties. Even Uganda’s so-called “Movement System” is underscored by the continuing existence of powerful political parties and a robust pressure on Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government to open up the political system to multiparty political competition. While the proliferation of parties is serving to work against the opposition as we have seen in Kenya and Zambia, it would eventually become crystallized into a vibrant multi-party political system.
In place of military dictatorships, we are seeing civilianized military juntas as in The Gambia, Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In place of endless murderous wars, we are seeing pacted conflict resolution initiatives with varying levels of resilience as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and even Rwanda. The reality of the present is that they have all more or less subscribed to democracy and constitutional governance.
All over the continent, the discourse of politics now reflects issues of women, gender equality, transparency, constitutionalism, and the cultivation of democratic values. This was certainly not the case a decade or so ago.
Continuing a long tradition of activism, thousands of non-governmental organizations across the African continent such as the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs) in Kenya, The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), the Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR) in Nigeria, and the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) and Kituo cha Katiba (KcK) in Uganda are engaging in various activities designed to open up democratic spaces and consolidate democratic experiments.
Scholar activists/activists are no longer content with just organizing demonstrations and rallies. They are no longer satisfied with just criticizing the custodians of state power. All over Africa, they are joining existing parties, forming or joining new parties or running as independent candidates where the laws permit. Scholar activists like Abdulaye Bathily of Senegal, Ibbo Mandaza of Zimbabwe, and Peter Anyang-Nyongo of Kenya have been quite active in politics. In Nigeria, Olisa Agbakoba, Abdul Oroh, Femi Falana, Nkoyo Toyo, and Shehu Sani are some of the activists that are expressing and/or working hard to get into power via electoral politics.
Continuing a tradition of critical and progressive scholarship, the interrogation of the democratic project has continued in the works of leading African scholars like Mahmood Mamdani, Berekett Selassie, Issa Shivji, Joe Oloka-Onyango, Eboe Hutchful, Thandika Mkandiwire, Pita Agbese, and Aaron Gana. They continue to work with civil society groups, lead democracy-focused non-governmental organizations and use every opportunity, formal and informal, to push the democratic agenda.
Unlike the past, we are now witnessing a robust interest in budgets and budget analysis as well as a persistent call for accountability and transparency in political relations and the management of public funds. Scores of NGOs have been established to monitor how budgets are made, presented, and implemented.
It is in the context of these contestations and engagements as well as changing character of politics within and beyond the continent that we can understand the new interest in constitutions and constitutionalism as part of the larger agenda of good governance, political accountability, social justice and democratization. Most African states are now beginning to appreciate the centrality of constitutions to the democratic process. Of course, these demands for new constitutions have not come from the magnanimity of the political leaders. In every instance, the leaders have been forced to make concessions to constitution reviews through the organization, agitation and networking of civil society groups. While countries like Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Namibia, and South Africa have opted for variants of participatory constitution making as mechanisms for mobilizing the populace, resolving festering conflicts, and reforming the nature of governance, others like Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria have used constitution making as a strategy for organizing a transition from military dictatorship to democratic rule. Yet, others like Zambia and Kenya have used constitution review processes to contain political opponents or civil society groups as part of a strategy to maintain the status quo.
Most African leaders are now realizing that a truly popular constitution would serve the interest of those in power and establish a legitimate basis for governance. This is because the existence of a popular and legitimate constitution anchored in civil society is the strongest and most reliable panacea to military coups and counter-coups that have been the bane of constitutional governance in Africa. As well, a people-driven constitution making approach would contribute significantly to the reduction of conflicts and pressures on the state, its institutions and custodians. Aside from using the process to resolve burning national issues, a participatory approach is probably one of the best panaceas to instability, public cynicism, and general alienation from government. When a people collectively compact a constitution, they can also be expected to defend it against political adventurers and other anti-democratic forces. It is equally the best way to cultivate a culture and tradition of reliance on dialogue and consensus rather than the resort to violence in the political process. Let us focus on our country Nigeria. Why would we need a new popular constitution?
The National Question in Nigeria: Dismantling the Postcolonial State
It is possible to argue that the problems of the Nigerian social formation could be found in how the state was constructed; the nature and character of its custodians; the politics and power balances that contribute to the articulation of public policy; and the general inability of the custodians of state power to develop a sense of nation and a national project. The Nigerian elite have become obsessed with the “power project” not for promoting growth and development but for inflicting pain and misery on the peoples of Nigeria. The state, largely illegitimate and non-hegemonic, appears to be designed to reproduce the contradictions that undermine it and erode its already tenuous legitimacy. These conditions are evidenced in the character and behavior of its custodians. The violence that has accompanied party primaries in the country shows clearly that the criminal and pathological fixation on the capture of raw power has driven the Nigerian politicians to Hobbesian levels where life is now uncertain, nasty, brutish and quite often short. Given that only a few members of the power elite are often ignorantly shaping the context and content of politics, it is no wonder that all rules of political engagement do not apply in Nigeria where violence rather than service is often the starting point of political calculations. Political discourses, if we can so speak, are pedestrian, disorganized, opportunistic, and sound-bite driven. It is no wonder that the so-called governments or political contraptions that often result from these normless struggles often lack legitimacy, ideology, credibility and the ability to comprehensively respond to the yearnings of the masses. It is a government that is often very much delinked from civil society and from the people. In fact, it is a power arrangement dedicated to the reproduction of the status quo and to the recycling of political rascality and mediocrity. Underdevelopment, foreign domination, poverty, crime, violence, insecurity, corruption, and illiberal democratic values continue to shape inter and intra-class relationships.
The construct of post-colonial politics in Nigeria was a clear recipe for disaster. The state, unable to emerge as a relatively autonomous force became the primary instrument of accumulation for the weak postcolonial elite. The arrogance with which the Nigerian elite steal and mismanage public funds and property probably has no rival in the world. There seems to be a local school somewhere where new recruits into the public services and parastatals, and now even the private sector, are schooled in the art of stealing, criminality and mismanagement. The struggle of the power elite since independence has been how to penetrate the state and use it to support all sorts of dubious primordial claims. This has contributed to the fragility and instability of the state and made it easy to find excuses for subverting the constitution directly and/or indirectly. When everyone attacks, loots, distracts, and violates the state, its structures and resources, what results is instability. As we have seen, those who captured the state, its instruments of force and resources, simply personalized it, wiped out all features of sensitivity, as they devoted their energies to searching for imaginary and real enemies who were readily found and unceremoniously eliminated or forced into exile. The state was hardly the sort of force that was capable of opening up the political space, mobilizing the people, and building a true foundation for democratic politics and constitutional rule. This undemocratic and non-hegemonic state was to be appropriated and presided over by an equally unsteady, weak, fragmented, and largely unproductive elite. In this equation, democratic governance and constitutional rule were gradually faded out of the political landscape. The poor and weak in society, in particular social or ethnic minorities became the first victims of an irresponsible and desperate post-colonial state. Let us begin by placing the discussion in the context of the issues that shape contemporary Nigerian politics.
Tendencies in Contemporary Nigerian Politics
The consequences of the contradictions of Nigeria’s history and post-colonial politics have generated certain broad and specific tendencies that continue to shape the country’s political economy. It is important to take a look at these tendencies because Nigerians are wont to forget or ignore them in the face of pressures from dictatorships and illiberal democratic arrangements. The military was unable to engage, mediate, or contain these tendencies and contradictions largely due to its commandist structure and character. The contradictions arising from the tendencies have survived various forms of military arrangements since 1966. Civilian governments have hardly done better. While post-colonial political alignments and realignments have been critical to the nature of Nigerian politics and society, the fundamental basis of the society has not changed even if new issues, institutions, contradictions, and coalitions have been introduced and in some ways power relations have been marginally reconfigured.
The structure of the Nigerian federation reflects the vacillations between civilian misrule and military dictatorships. Years of military rule turned the weak federation inherited at political independence into a unitary system. Most of the current politicians, bureaucrats, and other political actors have become used, even addicted to the commandist and authoritarian ways of the military. Today, while the states \cry that the centre is too powerful, they make demands everyday on the \same center for water, roads, hospitals, special grants, etc. The power elite is caught in the vicious federalist-non-federalist gyration: they enjoy the music and dance but hate the consequences and cost. This development has had far reaching implications for stability and democracy. Perceived or real inequities arising from a wobbled federal arrangement or non-arrangement for that matter have congealed loyalties to alternative sites of power. The net result is the further erosion of an already tenuous legitimacy. Opportunistic military officers have frequently capitalized on this situation to grab power and initiate another gyration in the complex waters of Nigerian politics.
The deepening economic crisis has had very far-reaching implications for politics, especially the building of democratic institutions. There is a tendency to ignore the economics of transition politics. In the Nigerian situation, deindustrialization, mass poverty, economic dislocation, environmental abuse, rising foreign debt and debt-servicing obligations, and the neglect of rural areas and producers continue to significantly affect the nature of Nigerian politics. The failed structural adjustment program and in particular, the unequal distribution of the pains and costs of adjustment have generated new political coalitions and interests that cannot be ignored in any serious discussion of the politics of the country. How can poor people tolerate the political shortcomings of the elite? How much participation can be expected from a poverty-stricken and alienated populace? Will the neo-colonial state have the resources to fully operationalize the requirements of a full democratic system? Will an unpaid worker be silly enough to vote for the same government/politician that has deprived him or her of wages that are legally due? Let us assume that the situation is not peculiar and that the entire nation is suffering from the lack of funds, are there indicators that the power elite and the custodians of power share the pains of the people? How do we explain their shiny long air-conditioned and heavily tinted cars, palaces in and outside the nation and wild parties with very expensive drinks and choicest meats? These issues have created a wide gulf between the leaders and the people thus making the cultivation of democratic values almost impossible.
The shifting or changing character of the Nigeria military is a central feature of contemporary Nigerian life. What to do with the military remains part of the critical political discourse in Nigeria. Yet, containing the military remains a very prominent political and vexing question. The proposals have been as diverse as there are interest groups: demobilization, re-education, constitutional control, reorganization, retraining, regionalized commands, total disbanding, and the democratization of recruitment into the military. Many of these prescriptions that are being put forward by some nationality groups and aggrieved communities are reflective of total dissatisfaction with the nature of the Nigerian federation, the character of leadership, and the injustices that pervade the country. Without doubt the Nigerian military, under Babangida, then Abacha had disgraced itself almost beyond redemption and aside from deliberately distorting national political structures, institutions, and relations within and between communities, it also remains a serious challenge to the survival of post-military democratic arrangements. In more recent times, the retired fraction of the military elite has begun to make a direct bid for power while retaining the capacity to significantly influence party formation, funding and selection of political candidates, ministerial appointments and political alliances. The capacity to execute these critical political initiatives has been directly related to the extent of corruption perpetrated while in office: after all, we know how much a general earns! These have clear implications for the nature of power politics in Nigeria. It has reached a level where only ex-military leaders and retired officers feel that they are most qualified to rule Nigeria. And today, as politicians fight amongst themselves rather than making life better for the people, they are busy wooing or romancing the military to keep their fingers on the trigger but not to fire!
The threat of authoritarianism remains very much alive in Nigeria. This is a tendency that has steadily built up since political independence but was given a specific form or character by the rapacious military juntas, especially the Babangida and Abacha juntas. The clear evidence is in the ease with which the late General Abacha almost succeeded in civilianizing himself and his brutal dictatorship. Though he died unsung and to the relief of several national and international constituencies, Abacha continues to enjoy the loyalty of elements across society that were part of his diabolical political agenda. Such a dictatorship would have made only superficial pretensions to democracy with the existence of five so-called political parties and a national assembly while continuing the suffocation of civil society. Nigerians would for a long time continue to have problems with how to wear down the authoritarian values and attitudes bequeathed by the military. This would not be easy because many of those that have been elected as councilors, legislators, governors and appointed into executive positions had been ardent supporters of the past dictatorships. While the only hope for effectively addressing this problem lies in strengthening civil society, it would require a lot of understanding and concessions from the custodians of state power to get on this path. This is currently not on the political screen in Nigeria at the moment as there is a clear disconnection between the state and civil society. If anything, authoritarian tendencies continue to shape the character of politics especially with the very illiberal dispositions of the post-1999 civilian order, the almost devilish fixation on a second term in office, the eagerness to wipe out opponents and the belief that popularity ought not to come from performance in office. When a governor, through the legislative acrobatics of a house of assembly, hands security and crime control to a group of cutlass-wielding thugs, then authoritarianism is being legitimated with serious consequences for due process and the rule of law.
The management of primordial identities and politics remain critical to determining the context of Nigerian politics, indeed, the future of the Nigerian nation-state. This has developed over the years into one of the top set of national contradictions that has led to the loss of thousands of lives and would continue until adequately addressed. There are several dimensions to this. Not only in terms of suspicions and contradictions between ethnic, religious, and regional interests but also within each primordial constituency. The tendency has been to focus so much on the contestations between the majority Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa ethnic groups that the minorities (except the Fulanis) have been more or less ignored or taken for granted. As well, within each of the majority groups are significant coalitions and divisions that mediate the ability of groups to act as absolute forces of mobilization. In other words, while ethnicity and religion remain very critical issues in the formulation of political interests and postures, they are also being mediated by issues of class and the relative consciousness of the Nigerian people as they confront the challenges of survival. To be sure, the ethnic and minority issue is directly tied to the questions of political restructuring, refederalization, revenue allocation, and democratic consolidation. Because, the political elite remains insensitive to popular demands on these issues, ethnic postures would get consolidated and become ever more violent. Already, invented identities are complicating the ability of ethnic groups to articulate clear political agendas. This has led to an internalization of violence as sub-ethnic groups engage each other in a struggle for supremacy and identity, as well as spurious claims to territory. On the other hand, as the unsteady state responds with more violence to this internalization of violence it further complicates opportunities for political negotiation. Of course, Nigeria’s misguided and selfish power elite assumes that half measures like rotational presidency, zoning, even so-called federal character would resolve the contradictions. Only true democratic values, good governance, accountable leadership, strengthened institutions, and enabling political environments would give meaning to some of these secondary-level prescriptions.
Resource generation and distribution often called “revenue allocation” in Nigeria remains one of the most critical aspects of power politics in Nigeria that is hidden behind the veil of ethnic identity. In some way, this is related to the structure of Nigerian federalism and the dominant role of the center. It is also tied to the question of minority rights, center-periphery relations, and the traditional contestation for hegemony between the dominant groups. Of course, given the neglect of non-oil wealth, the focus today is on oil that generates well over half of national revenues and about 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. The Nigerian rentier state has not just become the source of accumulation but it has also become the focus of elite competition and thus a stabilizing force: no one wants to hurt or kill the golden goose that lays the eggs! But minorities, oil producing communities, oil producing states, and bourgeois elements from oil producing areas are not pleased at the deprivations their communities suffer and the perceived ways in which oil wealth is used to promote development in non-oil producing areas. Until demands for a just and equitable formula for revenue allocation is found, these increasingly restless communities would continue to challenge the legitimacy of the state and reject existing policies. If the central government does not want to grant the demands from the oil producing states and communities for the use of the derivation principle as the basis of revenue allocation, then it has to find an alternative formula that would satisfy the communities. The Supreme Court ruling has only complicated the situation. The abolition of the onshore-offshore dichotomy is very welcome but not enough. Resource control is a political issue tied directly to refederalization or political restructuring. Again, this is clearly tied to the national question.
The character, organization, discipline, world-view and politics of the Nigerian political elite negate possibilities for democracy and federalism and confuses the right approach to engaging the national question. As indicated earlier, the Nigerian elite hardly operate under any clear ideological premise and even within the same party, they speak in discordant voices. The recent public quarrel among the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) is a clear case in point. Though the elite has always collaborated with military juntas, it has not fared well under the military. It has been abused, manipulated, divided, intimidated, and rendered almost useless by a rather arrogant military structure. Though it is only just beginning to reorganize itself, it would continue to pay for its experience under the military in the next three to four decades. It does not help an elite to be perceived by the populace as corrupt, irresponsible, unprincipled, unreliable, morally bankrupt, wicked and almost useless: forget the dozens of (t)chieftaincy titles picked up from hamlets and non-existent communities. As indicated earlier, the tenuous relation of the Nigerian elite to productive activities is directly responsible for its subservience to foreign capital and its reliance on the state for accumulation. Its fixation on primitive accumulation has prevented it from developing powerful constituencies, forging a vision for the country, and developing an ideological context for growth and development. This bourgeois class is highly factionalized and fractionalized and has been unable to significantly operate beyond the narrow confines of its ethnic and regional as well as ethnic and other dubious enclaves. Unless this bourgeois class begins to seriously construct its politics across primordial lines, it would remain incapable of constructing the type of national constituencies needed to build a new politics for democracy and development. The elite has already begun to pay for its allegiance with the past dictators as civil society groups are steadily capitalizing on the newfound democratic environment to question the credentials and credibility of the political elite, in particular, those holding political and elective positions. Developments over Sharia law, contestations in the Niger Delta and the Middle Belt, and permanent rumors of military coups are indicators of the failure of an unsteady and uncertain elite in charge of an unstable and non-hegemonic state. This is hardly a recipe for democracy or federalism because political uncertainty encourages absolutism and the privatization and concentration of power.
A tendency that does not appear to have improved is the largely conservative political agenda and world-view of the Nigerian elite. Nigerian politicians do not discuss gender and the environment. Largely a reflection of their conservative and opportunistic disposition, gender and environmental issues are beginning to emerge as critical issues influencing constituency building and democratic politics. Without doubt, the emergence of several NGOs and the experiences of the minority communities especially the Ogonis, Ilajes, and the Ijaws have contributed significantly to introducing the critical themes of minorities, resource control, the environment, and gender into political discourses in Nigeria. Environmental questions are now directly tied to contradictions and conflicts over questions of revenue generation and allocation and refederalization. As well, the corrupt and insensitive political styles of the custodians of state power are beginning to galvanize women all over the country to develop clear political programs.
The rise of critical and militant opposition politics in Nigeria evaporated to a large extent with political independence. At a point only students and sections of the working class bothered to resist dictatorship and the arrogance of power in Nigeria. Many of their leaders paid very dearly for taking opposing stands to governments and their agents. In the 1980s, human rights groups took the lead in opposition politics along with professional associations. Robust and combined opposition politics was only resuscitated in a national sense following the 1993 annulment of the presidential election result won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Since then, the country has moved along very significantly on the political front. Yet, all has not been well in spite of the emergence of scores of civil liberties organizations, new leaders, and opposition movements on the political terrain. The opposition has been vulnerable to penetration, domestication, corruption, and incorporation by the state and its agents. Many opposition movements have been characterized in several ways by undemocratic conduct, ideological bankruptcy, marginalization of women, ethnic and regional chauvinism, opportunism, limited vision, weak political programs, and a failure to build viable network for effectiveness. Many are simply urban-based, depend excessively on foreign sources of funding, do not strive to build new dialogues or cultivate new constituencies, and continue to have a very narrow definition of politics and power. How the opposition works out its own politics and interacts with civil society organizations will be critical to how Nigerian politics will be constructed and reproduced in the future. The withdrawal of the military from formal politics in May 1999 has now opened up new challenges and paths to engaging the state and its agents. The trend towards the clarification of objectives, identifying and training new leaders, building new networks, and working out more effective strategies to ensure maximum impact would continue to be critical to the depth and direction of democratic politics in Nigeria. This would equally determine, to some extent, how the military would react to the politics of power struggles in the future. It is wrong for the broad opposition to assume that the liberalization (as against democratization) of the political landscape is sufficient ground to relax and handle the state and its agents with soft gloves. Far from it, the task of democratic consolidation, the cultivation and nurturing of democratic values and the strengthening of democratic institutions is just beginning.
Finally, the tendencies that have prevented the strengthening of civil society, the construction of state hegemony, or the cultivation of democratic values have combined with other contradictions to reify power, prevent political engineering, and have led to authoritarian tendencies that are steadily making it difficult to deepen and consolidate our democratic enterprise. In spite of the good intentions from some levels of government, the prevalence of an undiluted commitment to undemocratic conduct has made governance an uphill task and constitutional reform impossible. There is too much ignorance in our politics. Our politicians have become masters at lying, diversions, intimidation, and monetization of politics. Among hungry, ignorant and deprived peoples, evil and undemocratic conducts easily thrive. Because governance, however defined, is the main business in contemporary Nigeria, those in power are doing everything to hold on to power. They have not shied away from using assassinations and other extra-legal means to keep power and intimidate potential and real opposition. On the other hand, those that are out of power are doing everything possible to unseat the incumbents. The contestations have been bitter and normless. This is where we must locate the problems of political restructuring and the challenges of refederalization after decades of irresponsible and vicious military dictatorships.
Under the military, Nigeria became a federal state in name only. All power came from Lagos or later, Abuja. All opportunities came from Abuja. All major contracts came from Abuja or from the offices of the representatives of the Commander-in-Chief in the various states. All Decrees came from Abuja and yet, the “lord” in Abuja was not elected by any one and was not accountable to anyone. The almighty federal government paid the salaries of primary school teachers in the various local governments. It constructed and repaired roads in the states and supplied drugs to state owned hospitals. The federal government polices all villages and hamlets in Nigeria from Abuja. In the days of General Abacha, a super federal government agency, the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) was even established to perform the task of several federal and state ministries. When the Federal Government fails, it sets up parastatals like OMPADEC and NDDC to perform the task of local and state governments like road construction and supplying chairs and tables to schools. Central planning became the ideological basis for growth and accumulation though it was hardly accompanied by any clear-cut ideological frameworks for combating dependence, underdevelopment, and instability. The so-called mixed economy became an excuse for using public funds to subsidize the confused accumulative strategies of an equally confused political elite. The state was turned into the accumulative machine of the bourgeois class. As they looted the state, largely aware that they could not be probed under a junta that was accountable to no one, they tightened their control over the state, its institutions and resources and did everything possible to keep others out. This generated deeper contradictions not only within and between nationality groups, but more specifically between elites that felt shut out of power and those that dominated power. This was also acted out within the military as coups and counter-coups became avenues for expressing the misguided ambitions of some military officers as well as a strategy for contesting the power space. The misguided Majors Saliba Mukoro and Gideon Orka-led coup of April 1990 that was ostensibly executed on behalf of the Christians and southern states of the country was a typical example of this trend. Without doubt, the military completely destroyed the fabric of Nigerian federalism and complicated the national question thus making it an almost insurmountable challenge for post-military democratic governments to reclaim lost ground. Today, the Obasanjo government is paying for the undemocratic legacies of military dictatorship. This is so because in the last three decades and more, most of the civilian elements that now occupy the seat of power in the new Obasanjo dispensation were virtually made by and under the military. The world-view and attitudes that they carry, more frequently than not, reflect the culture of military authoritarianism. This is very evident in the on-going battles between elected governors and their deputies over power sharing and in the battles between the executive (at state and federal levels) and the legislature. In fact, many of those frustrating the effort of the current custodians of state power and economic and political reform were those who got used to direct access to public funds for doing nothing and who no longer have such opportunities. They are the ones going about singing impeachment, resignation, military take over, and trying to precipitate instability and violence. The major crime of the Obasanjo government is that it has closed many avenues for bleeding the nation’s treasury among a class that is addicted to corruption and waste. It is in the effort to undo this damage that the issue of constitution making and the demands for a national conference have become central.
Constitutionalism and Recompacting the Political Space
Nigeria has never had a truly democratic constitution. To be sure, the country has had legal constitutions, but they have hardly been legitimate. The country has never adopted a participatory or process-led approach involving the various nationality groups and the various communities, constituencies and interests that make up the country in compacting its constitutions. It has consistently been elite-driven with the state playing a critical role in determining the content of the final document. It is no wonder that the constitutions have hardly served as coherent documents for determining the relationship between the ruled and the rulers and none has been able to ensure the rule of law and popular participation much less transparency, accountability, and social justice. Nigerian constitutions have been opportunistic documents designed to perpetrate what could be regarded as a political fraud on the nationalities of Nigeria in particular minority groups and non-bourgeois constituencies. Finally, Nigerian constitutions have never been instruments for ensuring the survival of the democratic project neither have they prevented nor discouraged the subversion of the democratic enterprise by the military. More so, the constitutions have not empowered the Nigerian people to have access to the structures of power or to the constitution so they could claim ownership of the document and deploy such ownership in the defense of their individual and collective rights. Today, everywhere that one goes, rights are violated. You try to rent a house, get a post office box, attend school, win a contract, sit for WAEC, NECO or JAMB even attend a university, your rights are directly and/or indirectly compromised, mediated or abused with impunity. Report a crime to the police you get into trouble. Ask for a police report you get into trouble or spend money. Ride your car on the highway, you get into trouble. Reserve a room in a hotel, you are told it has been reallocated to a big man when you arrive and with no apology or compensation. Take a case to court, you might lose your house and job and become bankrupt in the process. Try to get a news item into the media if you are not a prominent citizen, you would get no where. When a big man commits a crime and it is reported in the papers, his names would be “with held.” If it is a poor man or women, the names, address, village of origin even the identities of the children would be in the papers! Where does an ordinary person, who is not a chief, retired military officer, politician, or friend or relative to a big man go in Nigeria to get justice? Nowhere.
As indicated above, military rule destroyed the basis of Nigerian federalism. The concentration of power in the federal government and the commandist nature of military rule turned Nigeria into a pseudo-federal state. This has turned out to be the basis of agitations for autonomy and political restructuring demanded by the various minority groups, opposition and human rights movements, and ethno-cultural organizations.
The 1999 constitution hardly demonstrates any sensitivity to these issues. It hardly pays attention to questions of autonomy or reorganization of political power and though it pays so much attention to power and the definition of power, it is still lopsided in favor of the center. The states of the federation do not have control over their own resources. This is still the exclusive preserve of the federal government that has guaranteed only 13% of generated revenues to the states where the resources are generated (see below). This is no different from the situation under the military where the federal government illegally appropriated the resources of units of the federation and doled out meager portions to them under dubious fiscal arrangements. The debate in the oil-bearing and producing communities of Nigeria has long gone beyond percentages to one of control. The 1999 constitution could not have been more unrealistic and out of touch.
Under the 1999 constitution, the states cannot set up their own police forces. The State Police Force (SPF) is only a branch of the federal police force under a federally appointed inspector general of police. Section 214 (1) is clear on the fact that “There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.” According to Section 214 (c), it is the National Assembly that is empowered to “make provisions for branches of the Nigeria Police Force forming part of the armed forces of the Federation….” And the Commissioner of police for each state “shall be appointed by the Police Service Commission.” Even more ridiculous in a federal system, is that in the event of a need to maintain or secure public safety and public order within the state, a governor may direct the commissioner of police to take necessary action. However, according to section 215 (4), “before carrying out any such directions…the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter be referred to the President or such Minister of the Government of the Federation as may be authorized in that behalf by the President for his direction.” After Nigeria’s experience in the first republic, and given the bitter partisan quarrels that accompanied the 1998-99 elections, the federal government can hardly be regarded as not being partisan much less interested in objectively responding to crises in states if such crises might weaken the opposing parties.
The federal ministry of education does not just play a supervisory role; it also dictates policy to the state departments of education. Citizens in a state cannot form political parties that are registered in the state and interested in canvassing for support and contesting for office only in the state. In fact, all parties are to comply with federally dictated requirements and are to be registered with the federal government’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This goes directly against the autonomy of the nationalities of the federating units and erodes the ability of states to organize their political interests and processes independently. In fact, the entire idea of parties being registered by the federal government means that the same federal government could deny registration on the grounds that its requirements have not been met. Given the experiences of the past, what the 1999 constitution has done is to restrict the formation and operation of political parties to the wealthy. It also hardly recognizes the fact that not all parties in the world are necessarily set up to win national elections. This would continue to anger the minorities, the opposition groups, and locally based politicians. The idea of party registration is undemocratic and out of tune with commitments to democratic consolidation. Today, only the very rich, the crooked and the dubious can form, register and lead political parties in Nigeria. In other words, the cumbersome, expensive, and intrusive requirements for party formation and registration is a direct way of encouraging corruption, elite-dominated politics, and the continuing marginalization of persons without connections with the wealthy in the political process. The 1999 constitution negates a cardinal pillar of federalism by denying Nigerians the right to form political parties at any level they wish and by doing so, it subverts creativity at the local level by forcing it into the complex, corrupt and often compromised vortex of national politics.
Today, we can see the consequences of elite-driven party politics around us. None of the six parties can claim to be performing the basic functions of political parties. They are toys in the hands of the financier or moneybag, the big man or a clique that simply use them to harass others and make money. They do not identify, train and present the best candidates for office. They have mostly assumed members. I am not aware of any party that has recently or ever embarked on a membership drive and public mobilization and education agenda in recent times. They do not provide public education. Most fundraising are done in secret because they rely on persons with dubious sources of wealth. None has a well-organized, program-oriented and focused research center or institute for serious and sustained research and policy development. They are all fragmented and constantly bickering over leadership or contracts. Then there are gatekeepers who “own” the parties: the so-called godfathers- often reactionary, undemocratic and ignorant of the meaning and essence of democracy, they privatize opportunities for building new networks and building new voices and leaders. They want to build “boys”, personal loyalists and messengers that would carry their tired, outdated, and illiberal ideas to the grassroots. This is partly responsible for the political intolerance and violence at the local government levels. They see politics as one thing: the capture of raw power. The parties assume that the only reason why they exist is to win elections by hook and crook. Few in the political parties can effectively articulate party ideology and relate this to the challenges of growth, democracy and development. For the parties, elections are a “die and die affair”, not even a “do or die affair”. The parties are not democratic, as ordinary people have no voices. And of course, there are allegations of several parties being sponsored by one big man with a lot of money from sources that we all know. How can such parties become the bastions of democratic governance? It would be an insult to politics and political science to call these contraptions political parties. How many Nigerians have their manifestoes? How many have access to party records, accounts and programs?
Because the state wishes to continue the concentration of power at the center, it has avoided a direct engagement of the nationality issue. Thus it tries to forge a non-existent sense of nationhood by forcing political parties to adopt superficial national symbols in their logos, names, and presence in geographical spaces. The reality is that these can (and have) been done without a true commitment to unity and the integration of political interests and objectives. Most political parties that have described themselves as “national” in Nigeria’s history have been dominated by power elites from the North, East or West. Denying the nationality question is tantamount to postponing the evil day for Nigeria because the degree of political alienation in the country that gave rise to ethnic and regionalist groups like Afenifere and Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Ijaw Peoples Union, Ahaeze, Middle Belt Forum, Arewa Peoples Forum, Midwest Initiative, Eastern Mandate Union (EMU), Northern Peoples’ Forum, and so on, cannot be wished away through superficial institution building. Rather, Sections 221-229 stipulate regulations that are federally determined and controlled. In fact, according to Section 223 (b), “the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party must reflect the federal character.” Section 222 (f) requires political parties to have their headquarters in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. This is a clear negation of the rights of nationalities to form their own parties, restrict their activities to their states or local governments, and dedicate themselves to the improvement of their particular communities. Not every Nigerian wants to play federal politics. We all cannot and must not be forced to play federal politics. If my dream is to set up an Iuleha Peoples Party to run for elections in Owan West Local Government Area alone, why do I need offices in two-thirds of the states? Why do I need to register in Abuja? Why does the federal government need to give me permission to organize, mobilize, educate and serve my own people? Why do I need people from Zamfara and Yobe on my executive? It is left for Iuleha or Owan people to say we prefer am Edo Peoples Party or a Nigerian Peoples Progressive Party should I wish to aspire to positions outside my own LGA and if I fail to win elections three or more times I could merge with the preferred party or pack up shop and go into some other business. Then I would have been given a chance to express myself and would carry no grudge against anyone.
In a country with well over 250 distinct ethnic groups with a plethora of distinct languages, the 1999 constitution declares in Section 55 that the language of the national assembly shall be English, Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba. This ridiculous and provocative prescription is evidence of the arrogance of power that informs the politics of the custodians of state power in Nigeria. In their arrogance, they completely ignored the growing militancy, awareness, organization, and demands of the other nationality groups in the country. Thus, rather than accord all languages equality before isolating those to be used in the National Assembly, the constitution and its civilian and military framers simply ignored non-majority spoken languages in Nigeria. This attitude reflects the power configuration of the country and the poor social consciousness of the elite.
The 1999 constitution retained the vexing issue of the Land Use Act in Section 315 (d). This Act, passed in 1978 as the Land Use Decree under the previous General Obasanjo regime, has angered minority communities, those that feel margialized from the center of power, and the communities in the Niger Delta. It was the greed to control the oil wealth of the Niger Delta by an unsteady state and an unproductive elite that led to the promulgation of the Land Use Decree. The decree allowed top military officers, transnational corporations and members of the ruling class to grab large parcels of land at minimal cost in the name of farming. It is no wonder that leading community groups in the Niger Delta, including the Ijaw Youth Council, The Chicoco Movement, and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) have remained the forefront of opposition to the Act because it took away their land and vested all oil wealth in the federal government from which they feel marginalized.
The various Niger Delta communities and groups have clearly articulated their position, demands, and perspectives on the national question in various documents including the Ogoni Bill of Rights; the Kaiama Declaration, the Ogbia Declaration, and the Ikwerre Rescue Charter. The positions in these declarations have been endorsed by other democratic groups such as Solidarity Movement of the Southern Minorities of Nigeria, National Conscience Party, O’odua Peoples Congress, Movement for the Survival of Easterners and Niger Deltans, Eastern Nigeria/Delta Unity Association, Women of Nigeria International, and Igbo National Movement to mention a few. The 1999 constitution not only ignores these documents and demands but actually goes as far as declaring that the provision on the land use act (and those on the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), the public complaints commission, and the national securities agencies) “shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with their tenor and to the like extent as any other provisions forming part of this Constitution and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9 (2) of this Constitution.” The Land Use Act has been included in the Exclusive Legislative List and would continue to “have effect as Federal Enactment (…)…” This is not only insensitive to the demands of the various groups that have demanded increased control over their lands and other resources, but a clear demonstration of continuing federal domination of the states as had been the case under military regimes. Without doubt, this would continue to generate pressures, contradictions, and conflicts as alienated groups have made it clear that the repeal of the land use act remains one of their primary objectives.
The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is anything but federal and this reifies or seriously complicates the national question. One could make the argument that in spite of existing political structures at local, state, and federal levels, the constitution assumes that the military was still in power! It simply consolidates existing relations of power in favor of the central government. Section 4, Second Schedule outlines a very long list of Legislative powers. The “Exclusive Legislative List” is a long shopping list that includes everything with no attempt to bring in the states, much less the local governments. Part II of the Schedule contains the “Concurrent Legislative List” where both the Federal and the State governments have powers to make laws. Even here, the central government has the final say on all issues as the National Assembly is declared as the superior power whose laws shall prevail in the case of conflicts. The Third Schedule lists “Federal Executive Bodies” such as the Code of Conduct Bureau, Council of State, Federal Character Commission, Federal Civil Service Commission, Federal Judicial Service Commission, Independent National Electoral Commission, National Defence Council, National Economic Council, National Judicial Council, National Population Commission, National Security Council, Nigeria Police Council, Police Service Commission, Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission. These are simply national or federal commissions designed to facilitate federal regulation and control of the states up to the minutest details. In this context, it has hardly altered existing relations that had reduced the states to mere appendages of the federal government under the various military juntas. Interestingly, Part II of the Third Schedule lists only a handful of “States’ Executive Bodies”- the State Civil Service Commission, State Independent Electoral Commission, and the State Judicial Service Commission. The national equivalents, save for the civil service commission, continue to have significant influence in the performance of duties within the states. Thus, in terms of addressing the demands of prodemocracy groups, human rights organizations, minority communities, the various ethnic associations, women’s movements, the Niger Delta communities, and the widespread calls for political restructuring to return the country to true federalism with regional control over local resources, politics, and economic activities, the 1999 constitution has completely failed to address these issues. It is strong and long on power, but very weak and short on strengthening civil society, and serving as the basis for mobilizing Nigerians for the construction of a tolerant, inclusive, and democratic project. The constitution does not pretend to be the basis for operating a federal system of government.
To drive home its insensitivity to nationality agitations in the country, the constitution has provided very stringent and clearly unattainable conditions for amendments, state and local government creation, and boundary adjustments. Today, we can see the confusion being generated by this situation especially in the existence of so-called “unrecognized” local government areas all over the nation simply because they were not, listed in the constitution as were the existing 774 local government areas. What it wants to do is preserve the current structures that favor the majority nationality groups within the states and silence the yearnings of the minorities. This also translates directly to majority control over public resources within the excessively centralized power structures. For instance, to create a new state, Section 8(1) of Chapter 1 provides that an Act of the National Assembly shall be passed only if a request is supported by at last two-thirds majority of members representing the area demanding the new state in the Senate and House of Representatives, the house of assembly in the state concerned, local government councils in the area concerned, a referendum approved by at least two-thirds majority of the people in the area where the demand originated, the result of the referendum is approved by simple majority of all states of the federation through a simply majority of members of the houses of assembly, and finally the referendum result is approved by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority of members of each house of the national assembly. Aside from the scary financial implications involved in this circuitous process, the framers of the 1999 constitution knew very well that intra-party conflicts and competition, personality cashes, ethnic and religious as well as regional suspicious would make this process useless to the task of state creation. In any case, when was the last time Nigeria had a referendum? Clearly, the requirements already work in favor of those that dominate existing structures of power and accumulation: the status quo can be guaranteed to remain intact for a long time to come. Thus, with the 1999 constitution, the national question remains the number one issue in the country: how to dismantle the congealed and constitutionalized injustices in the interest of democracy and development.
The Politics and “Process” of Constitution Making 1999-2002
It is not difficult to understand why the Nigerian elite has refused to take advantage of the widespread calls and agitations for constitutional review through the massive involvement of the people, their organizations and communities. This is in spite of obvious threats to the state, lessons from other African and third world nations, and popular demands for political engineering across the country. We advance three main reasons for elite resistance to reform:
First is its acutely conservative political disposition and pedestrian ideological beliefs;
Second, it still fails to fully appreciate the dangers of ignoring political reform as it trivializes growing opposition, anger and the emergence of new sites of opposition and violence in the system;
Third, it is largely ignorant of developments related to constitutional reviews in others parts of the world especially in Africa. It hardly reads and assumes that Nigeria has little to learn from others since the country is a “giant” on the continent; and finally,
The custodians of power have developed a siege mentality. They feel that such a concession to reform would mean victory for civil society and minority groups especially those that have agitated for radical reforms since 1993. The Nigerian state and its custodians feel that conceding to popular demands is a sign of failure. Thus the political elite and appointed officials do everything possible to mediate and manipulate public discourses or tire out the opposition through piecemeal policy responses or by simply ignoring popular demands and proceeding with elite conceived alternatives. Such insensitivity or disregard for the public will is evidenced in the politics of constitutional review since 1999.
The Obasanjo government in response to the widespread condemnation of the 1999 constitution and the numerous contradictions that it has generated committed itself to a review of the constitution. Consequently, in 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo called on the three registered political parties represented in the national assembly to nominate six representatives each to constitute an “All-Party Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution.” Obasanjo was apparently concerned with the impossible processes of amending the constitution. His thought was probably that since the three parties were represented in the national assembly, it would be easy to get them to take the recommendations of the committee (made up of party selected representatives) seriously. He had not counted on the power tussles between the executive and the legislature and the fact that the national assembly would come up with its own parallel strategy for reviewing the constitution. The group put together by the three parties (later to include three women, one from each political party) became known as “The Presidential Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution (PCRC)” (initially the Presidential Technical Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution). After initial distractions and the use of a non-consultative, non-participatory, acutely conservative, urban-focused and elite-driven approach, the PCRC adopted a new strategy based on consultations and participation by the public. This strategy was to include: linking up with other initiatives in the National Assembly; a new presence at the local government levels; consultative meetings and conferences; research and publications; public campaigns and mobilization; international consultations; a reformed and strengthened secretariat.
The new approach of the PCRC was certainly a recognition of the need to take the initiative to the people and to democratize the process of constitution making. However, by not funding the Committee’s activities, the government cast doubts on its seriousness to truly review the constitution and to build ownership and legitimacy around the constitution through the massive involvement of the people. The Committee members were not driven by any clear ideological convictions. Its membership was conservative and it was frequently distracted by conflicts as quarrels within political parties were often brought into its work. Also, though the members were prominent figures in the three parties, they were not elected by the Nigerian people and could not be said to be representing Nigerians in all walks of life. Finally, the Committee could not reconcile its presidential mandate with similar initiative by the National Assembly resulting in a duplication of efforts and wastage of scarce resources. In spite of its efforts, its consultations and conferences were weak and ineffective and confined to elite communities. It did manage to produce a report and recommendations on a variety of critical and sensitive issues. The report, submitted to the President did not inspire the nation’s interest in constitution making. If anything, the recommendations in Volume 1 of the PCRC’s main report differed significantly from the views expressed by Nigerians through memoranda and oral submissions. For instance, while the views of Nigerians focused on true federalism and other aspects of devolution and reconstruction, the PCRC’s report was generally tentative and hesitant in several places.
The PCRC’s report was taken over by the Ministry of Information and turned into a bizarre show with undefined objectives. The Ministry had not been part of the consultations and meetings. Yet, it thought that it could “show” the report to Nigerians in the country’s geo-political zones and generate debates around it. The meetings were generally a failure and the effort dissipated rapidly without altering the mediated process of constitution making. This was a grave mistake and an opportunity to seriously build a national debate around the recommendations was lost.
The national assembly has continued with its own process of constitutional review. It considered the PCRC’s report as just one submission and traveled around the country. It is easy to note that Nigerians are generally unaware that such a process was going on. They have done nothing to show that lessons are being drawn from other African experiences and that there is a commitment to using the process to address the national question. The bottom line is that the national assembly is not working with civil society groups. The same political insensitivity and arrogance that has shaped Nigerian politics into a conservative and backward looking affair continues to reign supreme. The majority of Nigerians have no idea that the National Assembly is involved in a review process and in any case, its weak and uninspiring effort has been bogged down by alleged lack of funds! Thus, neither the PCRC nor the national assembly has made any serious and concrete achievement in the area of constitution making and constitutionalism. If anything, there is still a huge gulf between the problems and contradictions of state and society on the one hand and the so-called constitution making exercises on the other. The fact that calls for a national conference with or without sovereign power continue to ring loud all over the country is evidence that the efforts have yielded little.
Moving the Nation Forward: An Alternative Constitutional Strategy for Nigeria
Nigeria cannot avoid a truly consultative approach to constitution making. There is no culture of constitutionalism in the country. Hence governance is arbitrary, power is used normlessly, and impunity reigns at all levels of authority. As a coup prone country, a participatory approach to constitution making is one way to mobilize the people and reorganize politics away from elitist and individualistic gyrations in conservative politics to a socially based and truly democratic alternative. To proceed along the lines of a process-led and people-driven approach therefore, and to effectively engage those critical issues of nationality, identity, citizenship, religion, region, class, politics and power, Nigeria must pay urgent attention to the items below.
Reintroducing the new approach
The nation must start afresh, with lessons drawn from other African experiences especially South Africa, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea Rwanda, and Ghana on the importance of a people-drive, process-led, bottom-up, participatory and consultative approach to constitution making. We must draw lessons from other nations on the centrality of the people in the political process and how to build ownership and legitimacy through the mobilization, education and involvement of the people and their communities. We must learn how to use the constitution making process to promote national dialogue, constructive restructuring of power and politics and engaging the national question. It is important to admit past failures, emphasize current challenges and the need for restructuring, call on all citizens to join the process and assure the people of government’s respect for the initiative.
Maximum Involvement of civil society
Civil society groups are currently not involved in any discussion with the power elite on the constitution making process. This is a grave mistake. Any such effort that ignores or trivializes the contributions of civil society is doomed to failure. In building a people’s constitution, it is critical that all interest groups be involved- women, the youth, human rights groups, minorities, nationality groups, the private sector, academics, students, security services, and labor. A Civil Society Consultative Group should be established to facilitate maximum collaboration and consultations. Groups such as the Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform; Centre for Constitutional Governance, Center for Constitutionalism and Demilitarization, Civil Rights Congress, and Committee for the Defence of Human Rights must be involved in the review process.
Representation, Inclusion and Autonomy
Nigeria has never had a truly inclusive and representative constitutional committee or commission. A genuine review process cannot be carried out without the direct involvement of the youth, women, the military and security services (that have overthrown previous constitutions), and civil society. Just appointing prominent figures, politicians, conservative lawyers and businessmen is an outdated way to review or recompact a constitution. For the Nigerian situation to move forward, a Commission that is truly inclusive of the interest groups and communities in the country would have to be established. Such a Commission would have to enjoy substantial autonomy in its work in order to carry the people along and for its prescriptions to be taken seriously. The head of such a commission must be carefully selected to enhance credibility and popular participation.
Deadlock breaking mechanism: an elders committee
Since there would be several contentious issues that would not be easily resolved in the constitution making process such as revenue allocation, the role of state INEC, registration of political parties, Sharia, affirmative action, resource control, state police etc there is a need to set up a body that would assist the review process in this sphere. Such a committee would be made up of elder statespersons carefully selected to reflect zonal or regional, religious, gender, and ethnic balance. There is a need to learn from South Africa and Eritrea.
Nigerians in the Diaspora
As is well known, Nigerians abroad contributed significantly to the fight for the redemocratization of Nigeria. Traditionally, they have never been consulted on issues at home. Yet, they are beginning to take a direct interest in Nigerian politics. Many came home to run for office or to support candidates in the 1999 elections and more would participate in the 2003 elections. It would be important for the constitution review committee to set up a few “offices” for the collection of memoranda from those abroad and to disseminate information on its activities. The Minister of Justice should work with the Foreign Minister to utilize the facilities of Nigerian Missions abroad for the collection of memoranda. At some point, representatives of the Committee might wish to travel to selected locations abroad to receive oral and written submissions. It would be important also to appoint at least two persons (male and female) from the diaspora into the civil society consultative group. Again, Eritrea provides a good model here.
Women and constitution making
The Presidential Committee had only three women. This is unfair in a country where a little over 50 percent of the population is female. In fact, the three women were added as an after-thought. It is critical that gender sensitivity is reflected in the entire process. Ultimately, it would be a sign and measure of the quality of Nigeria’s new democratic enterprise and evidence of sensitivity to the realities of the 21st Century. So far, neither the PCRC’s process nor the national assembly’s initiative has given any special consideration to issue of mainstreaming or centralizing gender, in particular, the place and role of women in our struggles for political, social and economic restructuring. If this is not rectified all current efforts would be in vain. Engendering the constitution making process must be seen as central to its legitimacy, quality, and worth as a democratic document. We can draw important lessons from Uganda and South Africa.
Involving the youth
Nigeria has no serious youth policy. When they are not seen as some sort of troublemakers, they are simply ignored. A country that does not acknowledge, respect, guide, and invest in its youth is doomed. Again, the constitution making process thus far hardly includes any sort of strategy for guaranteeing the protection of the youth. Though they are frequently described as “leaders of tomorrow,” they are marginalized from being involved in planning that tomorrow. A serious constitution making process must be seen as an opportunity to mobilize, educate and involve the youth in planning the future. So far, this is not being done. We must learn from Eritrea, Uganda and South Africa.
Final Legitimization of the Constitution
The issue of how the final constitution would be approved has to be addressed up-front. The PCRC sent its recommendations to the President. The President may send a bill to the National Assembly. But the assembly is currently running its own process of constitution review. How would the national assembly treat the PCRC’s report? Is the Assembly still expecting a bill from the president? Would the Assembly constitute itself into a Constituent Assembly? Would there be a referendum after that? When would this be? If there is a referendum, it could give the people the final say and the process of constitution making the final stamp of legitimation. On the other hand, if the process were not adequately executed, then it would provide an opportunity to reject the document and could precipitate some crisis. Again, this is an issue that ought to have been cleared by now. Knowledge of what happens at the end of the race might influence the level of public participation.
Publicity, propaganda and presence around the country
The PCRC tried to establish its presence around the country. But this was so badly done that there was no consistency and the results were hardly visible. The initiative was not followed by a strategy of abridging the constitution and producing user-friendly versions for mass distribution and public education. The constitutions of other countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana and South Africa were not made available at all local government offices. Massive publicity and propaganda did not accompany the PCRC’s efforts. In fact, radio, TV, cartoons, research, conferences, public meetings, face caps, T-shirts, stickers, billboards, leaflets and targeted meetings were hardly used or only in a very restricted manner. School children were not brought into the picture. Elders and rural people were simply ignored. No wonder the entire effort to date has remained elitist: a discussion among the so-called educated, urban-based and relatively comfortable persons. This strategy must be taken seriously as it is the only way to let the people know that a process is going on and build ownership around the document. We should learn from South Africa.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the Vice-Chancellor, the Director, Institute for Governance and Development, Ladies and Gentlemen. I know that this has been fairly long. It was important that I make my case as much as possible. Let me now conclude by making a few recommendations for the future of our great country.
First, I would like to warn the Nigerian power elite that they are once again putting Nigeria on the path to destruction and authoritarianism. These same elite and their progenitors precipitated a civil war, several coups and counter coups as well as the current economic predicaments of the country including a huge foreign debt profile. Their unguarded, insensitive, provocative and undemocratic conducts and pronouncements in heating up the political landscape and promoting cynicism, suspicions and violence. They must call themselves to order immediately.
Second, the federal government must not hesitate to bring the full force of the law against any politician, chief, religious leader or individual who directly or indirectly promotes intolerance, violence and acts that are likely to subvert the country’s democratic process. All cases of threat and assassination must be fully investigated and appropriate sanctions meted out to those found guilty. This is the only to assure candidates and the public that the political process would be open, free and fair.
Third, political parties must hold themselves accountable for the actions of their leaders and members. INEC, the police and judiciary must be prepared to take drastic action against the parties and their leaders for any act of violence. The parties must all begin to design mechanisms for party discipline and be prepared to punish those politicians that revel in indiscipline, corruption, arrogance, and violence.
Fourth, where political parties accept decampees at least 6 months to any election, such persons must miss one election exercise before putting themselves up for election. This way they do not upset existing party programs and try to force out existing candidates through intimidation, bribery, thuggery, manipulation, lies, and other extra-legal mechanisms. It would check irresponsible and opportunistic decamping from party to party, corruption, and violence.
Fifth, allow me to warn all the parties, especially the AD, ANPP, and PDP that the imposition of candidates would ruin them and the nation. If incumbents have performed and are good and have connected with and carried the people along in the last three years or so, no one can beat them at the primaries. Tinubu in Lagos is an example of a governor that is running on his record of performance. Sure Lagos is rich, but there are states that have made more money than Lagos in the last three years and have nothing to show for it. If incumbents have been bad, they do not deserve to remain in office. Imposing them would lead to protest votes and decamping to other parties. The three “new” parties might benefit from such developments. It is not too late for incumbents to build new networks and mobilize understanding and support. All positions would become vacant at the end of the respective terms and democracy requires that people re-seek the mandate of the people. If there are no vacancies, then why have elections?
Sixth, the Nigerian people are going to have one more opportunity to liberate themselves from disease, hunger, waste, criminal leadership, unpaid salaries, inflation, and marginalization. They must use their votes wisely. A word is more than enough for a fool. It is ordinary people that are often recruited for violence, thuggery, rigging, intimidation and so on. Hunger and unemployment are not excuses for stupidity and indiscipline. They must use the 2003 elections as opportunities to correct existing political mistakes and must see through lies, political arrogance, and the oratorical fecundities of politicians.
Seventh, I do not see an alternative to a national conference in this country. If we had a national conference since May 1999, we might have avoided many of the pitfalls, hot points and fault lines that currently characterize our nation’s politics and society today. Things have become really bad. We do not trust each other. Criminals are being celebrated. No amount is too large to steal and no community is too civil to be wiped out or terrorized. Power has become an instrument to loot, kill and destroy. Values have been subverted. Ideologies have become worthless. Leaders have become frightened, tired and weak. Institutions have come delegitimated. How many of you here trust the police? Love the customs? Have anything to do with the fire services? Our people are hoping against hope. Tears are no longer the preserve of the hungry. Frustrated young men have become armed robbers. Greedy and misguided young women have become prostitutes. There is hardly a distinction between a professional prostitute and spinster today. Our campuses have been captured by cultists, armed robbers, thugs and persons with no interest in academic excellence. No university building is too strategic to be torched as we just saw at Delta State University. Armed robbers, indicted public servants, crooks, pimps, and 419 king pins are being made chiefs and celebrated as heroes. In sort, the fault lines in our society are getting wider by the day as massacres, intimidation, violence, corruption, compromised and contaminated leadership, and poverty continue to eat steadily at the nation’s fabric. The solution in my mind is a two year national conference at the Ward, Local Government, State and national levels. Truly comprehensive, involving all segments of the Nigerian society and culminating in the production of a new national agenda. A conference would not break up the country and would not in any way challenge the power of those in office. Of course it would set new rules for accountability and transparency, social justice, environmental protection, women’s rights, religious harmony, ethnic equality, freedoms, socio-economic rights, and the mechanisms for capturing and deploying power. I would concede that a sincere, serious, representative, well funded, and autonomous constitution review process can achieve similar objectives as was the case in South Africa. The choice is there for the power elite. If it fails to seize the moment and bring about critical reforms and anchor the future of our democracy in the people and their communities, it would have itself to blame pretty soon. Nigerians must make support or non-support for a national conference or a truly consultative, inclusive and people-driven constitution reform a political and campaign issue. Those candidates that refuse to support the agenda should be voted out of office without remorse. It is only through such reforms, involving the people and their communities that we can redress the structural deformities in the system, get a truly democratic constitution, promote social justice and build as foundation for social security and democracy.
I thank you for your patience.