Paper presented at the conference on “The State in Africa: Beyond False Starts” Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan, April 11-14, 2002.
We are united in our conviction that the crisis currently engulfing Africa, is not only an economic crisis but also a human, legal, political and social crisis… At the same time, the political context of socio-economic development has been characterized, in many instances, by an over-centralization of power and impediments to the effective participation of the overwhelming majority of the people in social, political and economic development… nations cannot be built without popular support and full participation of the people…i
To democratize Africa successfully, it is necessary not only to effect a political transformation of the state but also a social transformation of society…ii
It would not be an exaggeration to declare that the most critical challenge facing Africa today is how to dismantle and reconstruct the non-hegemonic, oppressive, exploitative, insensitive and undemocratic state. Though the on-going liberalization and democratization projects have resulted in changes in the composition, structure, operations and powers of the postcolonial state, it remains essentially an undemocratic force. Today, there is agreement across political or ideological lines that the reconstruction of the state is critical to the sustenance of democracy as well as to the promotion of growth, development and democratic values. Civil society groups, more than any other constituency, have played a central and critical role in the struggle to engage the rapacious state and set up new rules of politics. In this paper, we examine the background to he emergence of the state in Africa, the new contestations to reconfigure the state, the civil society strategy of using the politics of constitution making to redefine the content and context of politics.
History and the Construction of the Non-Hegemonic State
There is agreement in the literature that colonialism created a very exploitative, insensitive and oppressive state. In fact, the colonial state combined the functions of the legislature, executive and judiciary in itself, used violence without qualms, and dedicated itself to furthering the selfish interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie at the expense of Africans. Political independence did not generally mean the dismantling of these undemocratic and repressive structures and institutions that the colonial state had put in place. The culture of misrule that followed political independence all over the continent subverted the ideals of the nationalist struggles. Claude Ake is quite clear on this pint: “The character of the colonial state did not change significantly at independence since with few exceptions, the colonial state was inherited rather than transformed. Like the colonizers before them most of the nationalist leaders regarded the state as the instrument of their will. They privatized, and exploited it for economic gain and used it oppressively to absolutize their power. Even after independence, the state in Africa has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few who control it.”iii
Today, the inherited legacies of devastating colonial domination and exploitation continue to have far-reaching implications for contemporary power balances, politics, and policies. Political independence in Africa did not witness the dawn of democracy and political responsibility. Even in those countries where independence came through a revolution, constraints arising from dependence, underdevelopment, and cold war politics made it virtually impossible to build true democratic structures, cultures, and processes. Angola is one such country where political independence from a brutal Portuguese regime encouraged Western support for Jonas Savimbi’s rebel movement that continues to destabilize the economy, his recent demise notwithstanding. In a country like Zimbabwe, a compromised independence negotiation with the British mediated the ability of the post-colonial government to redistribute land and promote transparent governance. Today, ordinary Zimbabweans are paying for this costly miscalculation. Thus, in virtually all African social formations, the distortions and disarticulations of the colonial experience and the constraints of neo-colonial underdevelopment and dependence ensured that the opportunity to initiate a national project was compromised. In fact, Africa simply moved from one crisis to another even as efforts were made to address the numerous contradictions and conflicts that followed the post-colonial alignment and realignment of social, economic and political forces and interests.
The state inherited at independence was a violent, undemocratic, and privatized structure that was barely constituted to serve as the basis of governance or efficient delivery of services. Under colonialism, public policy was not a public process. Democratic values were ignored or suppressed. Primordial loyalties were politicized and used to manipulate individuals and communities. It was insensitive to local values and needs and it imposed taxes, levies, fees, and laws at will and without consultation. Its primary concern was with maximizing profits and the general extraction of surplus to satisfy the interests of the metropolitan state and dominant classes. It relied on extreme force and used its military power to visit violence on African communities without hesitation. Communities that refused to pay taxes, contribute forced labor or acknowledge the “legitimacy” of the colonial state were attacked or razed and their leaders killed or forced into exile. Africans were made to see themselves as subjects rather than citizens and indigenous values were bastardized or wiped out. The economic, political, and social programs of the colonial state were informed by a pathological fixation on satisfying the greed of European merchants and consumers. This state structure was not dismantled at political independence. Rather, it was simply “whitewashed” or “Africanized” and handed over to a carefully nurtured political elite that was extremely hungry for raw power. Leading members of the new African elite that had been carefully identified, educated or nurtured in the ways of European interests were domesticated and incorporated into the colonial political machines as political apprentices after World War II. As Claude Ake has correctly noted, “the state-building project in Africa….only succeeded in creating a state which is mainly a coercive force unable to transform power into authority, and domination into hegemony.”iv
At political independence therefore, the new elite inherited a state with limited legitimacy and without hegemony. This condition complicated the nature of political engagements. Of course, since only a handful of elites were involved in the contestations for power, the various governments they formed reflected and represented those narrow interests. Thus, right from election day the legitimacy of the government was compromised. In trying to exercised control, the elites have had to rely on force, manipulation, and violence. With time, politics degenerated into warfare. This was a war in which everything was deployed and no prisoners were taken. Pluralism and tolerance were thrown overboard with democracy, and intolerance and bestiality, at best, insensitivity to the plight of the disadvantaged became the order of the day. The foundation for instability, bad governance, corruption, violence, waste and the recycling of underdevelopment became firmly established. We are all familiar with the rest of the story.v
The dominant class at political independence was a pathetic parody of what a dominant class really is. This reality complicated the continent’s chances of engaging the forces of neocolonialism and the contradictions of underdevelopment. Thus, right from the 1960s, the possibility of building new structures of accommodation, pluralism and good governance were mediated, even subverted by the nature of Africa’s political elite. The new elite, including the nationalists, settled into an unequal, exploitative, and subservient relationship with foreign capital at the expense of the workers and peasants. Aside from the fact that it was small in size, it was also a very pretentious, underdeveloped, dependent, corrupt, and highly fragmented class. It lacked confidence in itself. It was reliant on foreign tastes, markets, and its world-view was externally determined. It had only a tenuous relationship to production and its accumulative base depended on its lucrative but unproductive relationship with foreign capital. Its economic strategy was largely determined by its ability to divert public resources away from development and basic needs into private interests and foreign bank vaults. With its tenuous accumulative base, the African bourgeois class turned to the state as its instrument of accumulation. Thus, rather than building a productive base in industry and agriculture, the bourgeois class began to extend the powers of the state to build up its own capital base. This required the abridgement of popular rights, the diversion of public resources to serve private ends, the construction of extensive security networks, and increasing intolerance for the opposition. It also required the development of vicious strategies of primitive accumulation and political containment that saw the working classes and peasants as the main victims. With time, the media, students, trade unions, peasant associations, minorities, and professional groups became victims of the emergence of the “big man.”
Those who captured the state, its instruments of force and resources, simply personalized it, wiped out all features of sensitivity, and imaginary and real enemies were found and immediately eliminated or forced into exile. Local “axes of evil” were found as necessary and were subjected to the most brutal and merciless power of the state. However, each act of brutality and repression bred new cells of opposition to the state, its institutions and agents. Within two decades of political independence therefore, the continent was littered with military coups and counter-coups, civil and inter-state wars, ethnic violence, agitations for autonomy by minorities, alienation of the public from the state and its custodians, and the withdrawal of support for public policies. Good governance was thrown over-board and leaders busied themselves with the construction of dubious ideologies, personality cults and looting their respective treasuries. As political decay, uncertainty, violence, and disillusionment replaced the euphoria of Uhuru, even fractions of the power elite began to construct parallel structures of power and opportunities. This was evidenced in the use of foreign schools for the wards, reliance on foreign hospitals for medical attention, use of foreign banks, airlines and advisers; the use of private security in place of public police, the reliance of private water bore-holes and private electricity generators in place of publicly provided alternatives, and investments abroad rather than in the local economy. The state was hardly the sort of force that was capable of opening up the political space, mobilizing the people, and building a true foundation for democratic politics and constitutional rule. Indeed, for most Africans, the state is “largely regarded as a hostile force to be evaded, cheated, defeated and appropriated as circumstances permit.” Hence, rather than perceive it as a force to organize society, support individual and collective initiatives for accumulation and survival, most Africans “have turned away from the state to seek safety and fulfillment in their community, ethnic group or nation. The demands which they make on these social formations have turned them into informal polities, in competition with the state.”vi
The truth is that the state is largely perceived as enemy and its custodians seen as crooks and unreliable characters. Loyalty is given to the ethnic or community group in the first instance because the state has failed woefully to inspire confidence, patriotism or commitment. Those that have tried to shift loyalties away from the ethnic group to the nation-state have been forced to “return to base” as their hopes for a democratic, transparent, and supportive state evaporates in the face of criminal corruption, waste, violence, and at best illiberal political conduct. Worse still, its custodians have become obstacles to the attainment of the basic reasons why people agree to live together in plural communities. The “big man” in Africa has always been and remains a danger to society. This is a really dangerous, undemocratic character whose track record shows nothing but corruption, waste, violence, human rights abuses, misplaced priorities, and a pathological commitment to the recycling of mediocrity. The typical “big man” in Africa has no respect or regard for women much less gender equality. He is not interested in environmental protection. He is anti-intellectual and hates non-governmental organizations. He sees the media as a menace and minority rights hardly feature in his confused understanding of pluralism and social justice. He measures his worth or importance by the degree of poverty, disease and squalor around him. Rural people are idiots and illiterates and have no right to discuss national issues. The youth are stupid: after all they pay no taxes and have no grounds to comment on the challenge of national development. The so-called “big man” spends most of his time thinking and plotting how to corner public funds, subvert the course of justice, weaken public institutions to cover his criminal activities, and while constantly tooth-aching and bellyaching about how public facilities fail to work, does nothing about a viable alternative. The “big Man” is not ashamed to be in charge of an unstable, ramshackle, unsteady, inefficient and corrupt state. He insists on being called by all sorts of flamboyant names: “The lion,” “The Big Goat”, “The Huge Lizard,” “The Killer” and “The Rain Maker” to take a few examples. He carries himself as if without him the world would be destroyed by the almighty. His every word, even jokes are to be treated as law. He blames real and imaginary enemies for his failure. Impatient with democracy and due process, he contaminates, compromises and encapsulates the other arms of government. He does not hesitate to eliminate or exile his opponents. He constructs huge houses for his sycophants, mistresses and relatives. While closing local schools because of “irresponsible” and radical students, he keeps his wards at the best schools abroad. While reducing budgets to local health facilities he regularly seeks medical check-ups and treatment abroad. He attends the Mosque and Churches regularly and with fanfare but has a resident babalawo in the presidential palace. He has many cars and airplanes yet cannot operate a national airline. His morality stinks as he sleeps with the daughters of his ministers, priests, friends and contractors. He fathers children all over the place and has countless mistresses. He treats national resources as his personal resources and insists on being thanked for constructing highways and paying salaries to workers. He detests unions and strikes and constantly amends the constitution to check opposition. He is very convinced that he is the nation’s best warrior, bureaucrat, thinker, businessman, accountant, and sportsman. Even when he can hardly read a legibly written speech, he considers himself the best orator in the world. He humiliates his ministers in public and does not expect them to complain or resign.
The above is by no means an exaggerated rendition of the sort of characters that squandered Africa’s opportunities for growth, development and democracy and subverted post-independence constitutions. Today, many (if not most) African rulers still operate in this unsavory mold. With a non-hegemonic and very illegitimate state in place, this sort of dominant class could not enhance or protect civil society or promote constitutional governance. Africa was already set up for a steep free fall. The continent was already vulnerable for foreign penetration, domination and exploitation and to the vagaries of a capitalist dominated global system.
In the context of the cold war, it was easy to look West or East and to neglect internal processes of production and exchange. With foreign military and economic aid flowing in to subsidize the decadent and usually irresponsible tastes of the new power-elite in Africa, it was easy for the African state to neglect tax collection and the integration of the local economy. By the end of the 1970s, the entire political space of Africa had come under various forms of dictatorships- military and civilian all enjoying robust support from the West and the East. The plight of ordinary Africans meant nothing to the super and great powers. The powers, never insisted on democracy, transparency, human rights (save for Jimmy Carter’s tentative efforts) or social justice. Clearly, civil society was in trouble and constitutions were relegated to the continent’s political dustbin.
The end of the cold war left Africa’s dictators in shallow waters holding, as the saying goes, the short end of the stick. Deepening economic crisis that saw Africa on the margins of survival culminated in riots and violent attacks on the state, its institutions, and agents. Foreign aid dried up as Eastern Europe and other rapidly reforming economies opened new opportunities for Western capital. The failed stabilization and adjustment programs further discouraged investors, lenders and donors. In fact, many African states became overwhelmed not just by the imposition of economic and political conditionalities from abroad, but also by the increasing support for local non-governmental organizations by Western interests. The dictators, military and civilian, had to devise other strategies for containing the growing opposition at home and satisfying the donors and lenders. Even military dictators in Ghana, Niger, and the Gambia were forced to civilianize themselves and organize elections. Other dictators like Moi and Banda in Kenya and Malawi respectively, who had boasted that democracy was irrelevant, were forced to amend their constitutions and allow for multiparty politics. In Nigeria, despite the initial confused political gyrations, diversions and efforts to contain the liberalization process, the military was forced to beat a haste retreat in 1999 thus allowing a return to constitutional politics. Even in countries where the old buzzards of politics like Togo, Egypt and Cameroon continue to hold sway, they have been compelled to modify, if not alter their political styles, language, alliances, and programs. More importantly, they have all come to acknowledge the power of civil society and the constitution, and the fact that multiparty politics is inevitable. Of course there remains the issue of whether it is really possible for a so-called leader who had robustly and unrepentantly relied on lies, violence, corruption, intimidation, manipulation and the containment of democratic processes to suddenly become a democrat and believer in the value of civil society? Secondly, is it possible for the same state structures that had been used to loot, abuse, assassinate, corrupt and domesticate creative and liberating energies be used to organize a true transition to constitutional rule as well as to sustain democracy? This is where it becomes clear that irrespective of the route to democracy, civil society remains the core force in the sustenance and consolidation of the democratic project in Africa.
The New Politics in Africa?
More than ever before, there is a new energy and popular interest in democratic governance in contemporary Africa. For a continent that was awash with brutal dictators, corrupt regimes, misplaced priorities, institutional decay, and social dislocation and violence, the recent political openings and renewed commitments to democratic values present new opportunities and possibilities. True, there is much to worry about in the illiberal democratic realities of the continent. In fact, most of the newly elected politicians still act and sound very much like the dictators of the past. They appear impatient with democracy and perceive democratic rules as impediments to their ability to use power as they see fit. They express shallow and opportunistic commitments to democratic practice and are all too willing to subvert democratic institutions at the slightest opportunity. Even the so-called new breed leaders- Eritrea, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia- have disappointed observers and their citizens with the ease with which they degenerated into corruption, harassment of opponents, manipulation of civil society, closure or abridgement of democratic spaces, war and intolerance for criticisms.
This not withstanding, the emergence of new issues, new discourses, new leaders, and new political parties on the continent’s political landscape has altered the balance of forces and encouraged a radical realignment of political interests. Irrespective of the particular country concerned, there are certain common variables that are shaping the content and context of contemporary politics in Africa: the end of the cold war; donor complaints about aid fatigue; the end of apartheid and the emergence of South Africa as a central player in continental politics; the increasing unpopularity of military juntas; the increasing influence and power of civil society groups and the emergence of a new breed of articulate and pro-democracy leaders. To these, we can add the new commitment of international organizations and Western governments to the new democratic agenda; the new recognition of the centrality of pluralism, gender, identity and nationality issues in the articulation of political platforms; and the political impact of globalization requiring at the minimum democratic practices, respect for human rights, and multiparty political arrangements. Africa, in spite of its dependence, underdevelopment, and marginalization in the global divisions of labor and power has not been spared the impact of these developments.
Today, the political picture on the continent, though not quite clear, is radically different from what it used to be. Irrespective of frustrations over the depth and direction of political liberalization in Africa, the truth is that the political environment, the issues and the actors have changed dramatically. What are some of the indicators of this change?
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Though it is still a very long and painful way to the promised land of democracy and good governance, even the old buzzards of African politics have, at the very least, changed the language and style of their political activities. There is a new movement towards consultation and legitimizing power through the will of the people.
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The contestation for hegemony or control of the state is no longer dominated by the tiny class of elites. New leaders, new constituencies, and new political parties now litter the political field of all African states.
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It is no longer fashionable to develop a guerilla army and engage the state over disagreements on political reforms just as coups are becoming increasingly unacceptable to the larger society. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and other hot spots, there is a clear effort to negotiate, dialogue, build new political bridges, and terminate festering conflicts.
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In many African states, the political fraction of the power elite not only feels terribly embarrassed at its shameful performance on all fronts but it is also on the retreat even if temporarily. Its poor performance in governance and economic development since the 1960s has eroded its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This has to some extent mediated the traditional arrogance of power and humbled some of the so-called leaders. Hence in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, and even Kenya and Uganda, opposition elements are making great strides as the electorate continues to punish the old buzzards of politics by voting for “new blood.”
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Rabid populism, intimidation of civil society and political opponents, and the manipulation of primordial loyalties are no longer sufficient to buy or guarantee the support of the people. It is not amazing therefore, that the conservative custodians of state power have had no problems with conceding their failures and inviting or incorporating credible opposition elements into existing power structures to give a veneer of legitimacy or political rebirth. This is one way to understand Daniel arap Moi’s inclusion of Richard Leakey in his cabinet to assist with public service reforms in Kenya before he was disgraced out of the position. Even military juntas have had to make a hasty retreat from power as was the case in General Abdulsalam Abubakar’s junta in Nigeria. General Sani Abacha’s rule had thoroughly delegitimated the military and aroused a robust civil society opposition to continued military rule. Repression has not eliminated or discouraged support for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe.
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Women, rural folk, the youth and workers are increasingly re-entering the center stage of politics all over Africa. The process is slow but it is certainly going on. In Nigeria, there are on-going discussions on how to establish a viable labor party. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, the trade unions were in the leadership of the reform movement. In Ghana, students were very central to the defeat of Jerry Rawlings’ party the NDC. In Malawi, the church teamed up with opposition forces to dismantle Banda’s discredited one-person dictatorship. In Senegal, Abdou Diouf conceded defeat to Abdoulaye Wade in the March 2000 election as soon as he saw the monumental shift engineered by the active participation of young persons who were dissatisfied with the status quo. Again in Zimbabwe, young people constitute the core of the MDC’s power hence Mugabe abandoned the cities for the rural areas in the 2002 election campaigns. In Uganda, young people also constitute the core of the “multipartysts.” In spite of Yoweri Museveni’s efforts and promises, supporters of multiparty politics won the mayoral election in Kampala in the February 2002 election.
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In place of the one-party or no party state, we now have a plethora of political parties. Even Uganda’s so-called “Movement System” is underscored by the continuing existence of powerful political parties and a robust pressure on Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government to open up the political system to multiparty political competition. While the proliferation of parties is serving to work against the opposition as we have seen in Kenya and Zambia, it would eventually become crystallized into a vibrant multi-party political system.
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In place of military dictatorships, we are seeing civilianized military juntas as in The Gambia, Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In place of endless murderous wars, we are seeing pacted conflict resolution initiatives with varying levels of resilience as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and even Rwanda. The reality of the present is that they have all more or less subscribed to democracy and constitutional governance.
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All over the continent, the discourse of politics now reflects issues of women, gender equality, transparency, constitutionalism, and the cultivation of democratic values. This was certainly not the case a decade or so ago.
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Continuing a long tradition of activism, thousands of non-governmental organizations across the African continent such as the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs) in Kenya, The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), the Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR) in Nigeria, and the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) and Kituo cha Katiba (KcK) in Uganda are engaging in various activities designed to open up democratic spaces and consolidate democratic experiments. As well, leading African scholars like Mahmood Mamdani, Berekett Selassie, Issa Shivji, Joe Oloka-Onyango, Eboe Hutchful, Thandika Mkandiwire, Pita Agbese, and Aaron Gana, and progressive scholar-politicians like Abdulaiye Bathily in Senegal and Peter Anyang’nyongo in Kenya continue to remain active in politics working with civil society groups and pushing the democratic agenda.
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Unlike the past, we are now witnessing a robust interest in budgets and budget analysis as well as a persistent call for accountability and transparency in political relations and the management of public funds. Scores of NGOs have been established to monitor how budgets are made, presented, and implemented.
It is in the context of these contestations and engagements as well as changing character of politics within and beyond the continent that we can understand the new interest in constitutions and constitutionalism. Most African states are now beginning to appreciate the centrality of constitutions to the democratic process. Of course, these demands for new constitutions have not come from the magnanimity of the political leaders. In every instance, the leaders have been forced to make concessions to constitution reviews through the organization, agitation and networking of civil society groups. While countries like Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Namibia, and South Africa have opted for variants of participatory constitution making as mechanisms for mobilizing the populace, resolving festering conflicts, and reforming the nature of governance, others like Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria have used constitution making as a strategy for organizing a transition from military dictatorship to democratic rule. Yet, others like Zambia and Kenya have used constitution review processes to contain political opponents or civil society groups as part of a strategy to maintain the status quo.
Most African leaders are now realizing that a truly popular constitution would serve the interest of those in power and establish a legitimate basis for governance. This is because the existence of a popular and legitimate constitution anchored in civil society is the strongest and most reliable panacea to military coups and counter-coups that have been the bane of constitutional rule in Africa. As well, a people-driven constitution making approach would contribute significantly to the reduction of conflicts and pressures on the state, its institutions and custodians. Aside from using the process to resolve burning national issues, a participatory approach is probably one of the best panaceas to instability, public cynicism, and general alienation from government. When a people collectively compact a constitution, they can also be expected to defend it against political adventurers and other anti-democratic forces. It is equally the best way to cultivate a culture and tradition of reliance on dialogue and consensus rather than the resort to violence in the political process.
Civil Society and the New Politics of Constitution Making
It has become a tradition in the literature on African politics to point at the weaknesses of civil society. Quite often, this comes from scholars that are so far removed from the real world of civil society groups and who are so apolitical that they hardly make any contributions to resolving the plethora of problems they often catalogue. Generally this is unfair. They tend to compare civil society in the West with Africa and tend to transpose experiences from the present of the West to Africa. The reality is that civil society was not always developed or strong in the West. Second, Africa’s historical experience and the realities of contemporary domination, marginalization and exploitation make it unreasonable to compare the developed and underdeveloped social formations. Thirdly, African civil society is not as weak as often claimed. Who resisted colonial rule? Who runs the various trade unions, professional associations, non-governmental organizations, students unions, community development associations and other grassroots forces? Who builds the coalitions and networks that have sustained and supported the millions of brutalized and marginalized Africans? Who continues to critique and resist transnational corporations and misguided Western programs on the continent? Who provides the energy for resistance to the “big man” in Africa, a resistance that has prevented the so-called leaders from completely going overboard in their irresponsible ways? Who has organized the hundreds of demonstrations, conferences, meetings, and riots against stabilization and adjustment programs without safety nets to protect the vulnerable communities? Who organized the prodemocracy movements, fought one-man or one-party rule, opposed wicked military juntas, agitated for multiparty politics, human rights and gender equality? Who changed the content of political discourse in Africa away from elite issues to pro-people issues? The questions are endless. The best way to support and strengthen civil society is to acknowledge its achievements and monumental sacrifices made by its leaders. It is suspect, in fact fraudulent, when those who have nothing to do with civil society, take the lead in cataloging the weaknesses of civil society. Scholars have simply accepted the conclusions from Western academics and observers and recycled these without criticisms. Even in a structural or institutional sense, very few Western non-governmental organizations can cope with the realities, hardships, limited resources, and repressive environments in which their African counterparts operate. The fact that we see the state as omnipresent is not always a reflection of the weaknesses of civil society. In most cases, it is a reflection of its strength and its success in pushing the state to the limits of its defensive and survival strategies. Such efforts are what have precipitated the current political openings in Africa.
Of course, we concede that civil society could do more and strive harder to contain internal contradictions. These contradictions are not in any way unique to Africa. Given the history of Africa: from a diabolical colonial state through various forms of dictatorships, civil society was suffocated to the maximum. Political discourses were banned. Many leaders of civil society were jailed, assassinated or forced into exile. Registration was denied to many opposition parties and NGOs. In Egypt, it is criminal to receive donor money to work on democratic issues. In Nigeria, bureaucrats remain fixated on the character of the country’s undemocratic past: hence any NGO with “Democracy” in its name is automatically denied registration. All African governments as a way of silencing the opposition and reproducing the weaknesses of civil society used the strategy of intimidation, domestication and incorporation. In short, everything was done to ensure that civil society groups reflected and operated as appendages of the presidency or did not operate at all. It is therefore not amazing that even today, in spite of their unprecedented achievements, civil society organizations are still in the struggle to have their ideas and ideals fully acknowledged by the new democrats. To be sure, it is easy to find several organizations characterized by poor leadership, dubious programs that look like they were written by the IMF, opportunism, an excessive focus on the capture of raw power, and refusal to reach accommodation with each other. As well, many have been compromised by door funds, they remain largely urban based, and women are still very much invisible in their ranks.
The failure of the state and its custodians opened the way for civil society organizations to make determined efforts to influence the content and context of politics in Africa. Aside from the era of the nationalist struggles, at no other time have civil society organizations shown so much interest in politics. The end of the cold war, reduced support for dictators, support and endorsements from international organizations and foreign governments, and the massive inflow of donor funds invigorated civil society organizations and leaders. New leaders and new voices emerged to articulate new issues especially on socio-economic and cultural rights, gender equality, environmental protection, child rights, transparency, and democratization. For millions of Africans whose lives had been totally shattered by failed adjustment programs and despotic rule, these issues had meaning and they readily lent support. Professionals, women, peasants, students, unions, even the unemployed, flocked to join non-governmental organizations or to participate in demonstrations for change at great risk and costs. The numerous anti-SAP riots in Zambia, Togo, Nigeria, and Ghana were ready platforms for articulating democratic demands and calling for leadership change and multiparty politics. Specialized NGOs also built new networks and provided the masses with alternative views of the future. The delegitimation of the military by criminal leaders like Gnasingbe Eyadema, Sani Abacha, Ibrahim Babangida, Siyyad Barre, and Mobutu Sese Seko provided a contrast to democratic alternatives. Grinding poverty eroded or rendered useless the rosy promises of the past and made it easy for civil society groups to attract massive public support.
Through the efforts of civil society groups, Africans are beginning to see constitution making as the most legitimate strategy for dismantling the oppressive neocolonial state and restructuring it to reflect the needs of the majority. The problems of marginal or powerless communities arise from the unequal access to the structures of power. A popular, open, and democratic constitution making approach would enable them articulate the issues that affect them and become part of a process of compacting a constitution that would accommodate such issues. A constitution is no longer just a “power map” of society but also an instrument for addressing pressing social, cultural, and economic questions. The process of constitution making is equally an opportunity to build consensus on politics, economy and society through the involvement of the people. It reflects the general will of society and reflects their past and present and articulates their dreams about and for the future. In the context of the on-going robust challenges to the status quo and the popular articulation of alternative frameworks for understanding society, the compacting of new democratic constitutions is being used to check the rapacious African military, corrupt and irresponsible institutions, and the over-bloated, repressive, and non-hegemonic postcolonial state. As well, new democratic constitutions have become veritable instruments in the acknowledgement and protection of nationality, gender, environment, language, religion, cultural, and economic rights.
True, constitutions are by no means a new phenomenon in African politics. Even the Apartheid state had a constitution. General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Idi Amin of Uganda, Jeane Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Empire (now Republic), and Marcias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea as well as Gnasingbe Eyadema of Togo all have or had constitutions in one form or the other. But as we all know, these so-called constitutions were not even worth the paper on which they were written. More importantly, though some of them could claim to be legal documents, they were certainly not legitimate.
The illegitimacy of the majority of constitutions in Africa arise from the fact that they were not compacted through a truly open and democratic process that paid attention to the dreams, pains, and aspirations of African peoples, their communities, and constituencies. In fact most of these were directly imposed constitutions or elite-driven processes that treated the people and their ideas with disrespect, if not contempt. The hallmark of imposed constitutions is that they are never subjected to popular debates or referenda. If at any point the constitutions were subjected to public debates, such debates were often brief, carefully monitored and manipulated. The documents, either in draft or final forms, were never made available to the people. If referenda were called, the results were rigged in favor of the state and its custodians. In some cases, the reports of constitutional commissions were simply ignored after elaborate ceremonies aimed at diverting public attention and convincing donors and the international community that something positive was being done about democracy. These deficiencies have called for new principles and mechanisms to support the establishment of new rules and platforms for new democratic politics. Civil society groups have articulated these principles to include those of transparency, consultation, representation, participation, inclusivity, mobilization, continuous review, and popular ratification. The mechanisms include realistic time frame, leadership, technology and media content, outreach, training, full access to other experiences and documents, accessible language, and taking the process to the people.
Overall, if these mechanisms and principles are effectively utilized in the constitution making process, the dismantling of the postcolonial state and the construction of a popular national state on a democratic basis would have been collectively initiated. This is the only realistic way to avoid future violence, break the chains of dictatorship, promote the emergence of new institutions, cultivate democratic values and lay the foundations for democracy and development. Since the power elite cannot really be trusted in this task, civil society groups must remain in the leadership of state reconstruction in Africa.
Conclusion
One cannot but share Claude Ake’s view that it is wrong to focus on elections as the sole measure of democratic change because “in most of Africa, state power is constituted in such a way as to render democracy impossible. Therefore, more than determining the controllers of state power competitively, what is needed by way of democratization is the transformation of the state, for in the absence of such transformation elections can only be a choice between oppressors.”vii Those who focus on anything other than state transformation as the core of the liberalization and democratization process are pushing the wrong political cart. The nature or character of the state, especially how it is constituted and how it operates at all spheres determines the nature of power, politics, economy and society. If we agree, as we have argued earlier, that the postcolonial state has practically failed in promoting peace, harmony, growth, development and democracy, it follows that reforming it is a waste of time, scarce resources and energy. The task is to steadily but systematically dismantle and reconstruct it by altering, in a radical way, the nature and purposes of power.
Of course, a new constitution that is made by the people would reflect new values, new institutions, and new interests. It would protect minorities, the marginalized, and women. It would ensure real equality rather than nominal equality. It would provide new and creative avenues for exercising control over elected representatives. A new popular constitution would be sensitive to the environment and to socio-economic rights. Such a constitution would contain innovative ways of containing the military and making the constitution a living document. The rule of law, separation of powers, true independence of the judiciary, oversight institutions, and measures designed to remedy historical injustices to vulnerable constituencies would be constitutionalized.
True empowerment of the people and their communities is a requirement for the rebirth of democracy and the containment of political irrationality and irresponsibility. Yet, this can only happen when civil society is expanded and when activists and people with clear and reliable connections with the people make a bid for political power. Without political power, the popular agenda would be slow in coming, if at all. It is only through the control of political power that the state could be rapidly and effectively deconstructed and repackaged in the interest of the people. As Ake has rightly observed, ” (a)s long as the state remains a contested terrain and the point of this contest is the private appropriation of state power, the state must be undemocratic and arbitrary” Therefore, “to tame and democratize it, the state has to be seen as something that belongs to all and not to some, something which deserves support for the service it renders, not as a fearsome exploiter or an exploitable resource.”viii Political power makes it possible to build roads, schools and hospitals. Power facilitates the construction of new political platforms that rely on social democracy, mobilization, education, and participation. Political power allows new structures to organize resistance to imperialism and to articulate progressive ways of involvement in the global market and to engage the new globalization. Finally, political power allows the emergence of new leaders, new discourses, and a renewed commitment to radical restructuring and the consolidation of democratic values. Civil society groups have a central role to play in this agenda and without state reconstruction in Africa, the current democratic openings would easily be compromised and contained by illiberal democratic forces.
iEndnotes
Economic Commission for Africa, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Addis Ababa: ECA 1990), p. 7.
ii Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa (Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 2001), p. 167.
iii Claude Ake, Democratization of Dispowerment in Africa. (Port Harcourt: CASS Occasional Monograph No. 1, 1994), p. 7.
iv Ibid, pp. 6-7.
v See Julius O. Ihonvbere, The New Politics in Africa (New York: Trilantic Books, 2002 forthcoming); Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, op. cit. and Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Ibadan: Spectrum Books for African Centre for Democratic Governance, 2001).
vi Claude Ake, Democratization of Dispowerment, op. cit, p. 7
vii Ibid, p.8
viii Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, op. cit., p.189.
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