Imperialism and the Democratization Process in Africa

Finally, as part of its new package and in celebration of the triumph of US hegemony and the market, structural adjustment has been introduced as the only way out for Africa. As Adebayo Adedeji (1993: 44) has argued, the policy of adjustment was presented as the “only one game in town: adopt the terms of a Structural Adjustment Programme or perish.” Of course, as usual, the components of this policy was formulated in the West and packaged for imposition on desperate, poor, crisis-ridden and weak economies of the developing world, especially Africa. The programs are often negotiated with the same governments and elites that have been described as “rent-seeking” (World Bank 1989), “neopatrimonial” (Sandbrook, 1985, 1988; Van de Walle 1994; Bratton 1994), and “corrupt” (Diamond 1988). It is interesting to see the way adjustment is touted as the long-neglected remedy. One wonders why it took the intelligent West, with all its education, information, and technology so long to come up with this solution!
I admit that structural adjustment is necessary: many African states need to be more efficient, effective, leaner, and more supportive of productive ventures. Governments should identify areas where they can do more good and not put bureaucratic obstacles on the path of creativity and progress. It would however appear that the main problem the West has with African economies is that the controls make it impossible for their transnationals to exploit the African economies without restraint, transfer huge surpluses (far above their over-heads) abroad, and manipulate the economic processes to satisfy the metropole in the first instance. After all, even in the American economy there are controls on currency transfers; on foreign ownership in certain sectors of the economy, and on general economic activity. The capitalist state, as we mentioned earlier has always been active in the processes of accumulation and economic development. Yet, the orthodox prescriptions of devaluation, desubsidization, deregulation, commercialization, privatization and so on, in an underdeveloped, foreign dominated, and vulnerable economy; with a weak and unstable state, are designed to satisfy the dominant economic actors (foreign capital) and open up the economies to transnational penetration and exploitation. In no African country, not even in Ghana has the orthodox prescriptions worked. Foreign debts have increased, national control of economic policies mediated, and national autonomy eroded as IMF and World Bank officials, even Western ambassadors have taken charge only because these countries cannot import needed goods or receive foreign aid without the stamp of approval from the Fund and the Bank (Ihonvbere 1993). After all, as Edward V. K. Jaycox, (1992: 4) Vice-President, Africa Region, of the World Bank has noted, “in virtually every case, African countries have gone into adjustment only when they were absolutely desperate.” This desperation makes the foreign exchange-strapped governments vulnerable and gives them no power or room to negotiate and they are forced to accept whatever policy is dumped on them.
African leaders have become so intimidated by the Fund and the Bank and by western governments that many have surrendered the governance of their nations to these powerful agencies (Cheru 1989). Unfortunately, this is an area in which not much has been said or written for some inexplicable reason. The fear of African leaders is evidenced in the statement of a former President of Burundi at a talk at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin in late 1994. When asked to comment on his experiences with the Fund and Bank in relation to the implementation of structural adjustment in his country, he began be breathing a sigh of relief and declaring that he could now speak candidly and critically since he was no longer president of Burundi. He then went on to declare that adjustment as prescribed by the Bank created more problems than solutions but that it made it easy for these financial agencies to control his country just like other African states! Though the Economic Commission for Africa under Adebayo Adedeji tried to fight the Bank and Fund and orthodox adjustment to a stand still through the presentation of an alternative framework (1989) for adjustment in Africa, cowardly African leaders have been hesitant to embrace and implement the document, and the Bank has virtually ensured its marginalization just like it did to the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) through the “Berg Report” (1981). Today, African politicians and the vast majority of the pro-democracy activists, without a critical study and in the effort to satisfy the western agenda and be on the good side of donors, election monitors and so on, have embraced the IMF and World Bank versions of adjustment and this has been one reason why they have achieved very little on coming to power. As Stephen Ellis (1993: 139) has noted, “this is the most striking observation to be made about political parties, new or old, all over the continent: virtually all of them, explicitly or implicitly, are committed to World Bank policies. They simply have no other choice if they are to aspire to power, since donor governments all take their lead from the World Bank, which is itself closely associated with US policy decision.” Adjustment policies, imposed uncritically, on a sea of poverty, corruption, repression, mismanagement, and a generally unproductive environment stands little chance of making far-reaching changes that will promote democracy. How can the World Bank expect the very same corrupt leaders who piled up a $300 billion debt to execute such a serious program? The Bank overlooks history and historical experience, the ability of non-bourgeois forces to resist such painful programs; the depth of pre-adjustment crisis; the differences among and within African states; the differences in resource endowment and level of development; the nature of contestation for power; and the credibility and legitimacy of African leaders. Post-hoc social programs to protect vulnerable groups like the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in Ghana, introduced after the damage has been done, hardly helps in creating the required environment that will re-attract foreign investors, and promote consensual politics. It is difficult to believe that the World Bank, with all its consultants and experts had no idea as to the sort of damage its policies could cause in such poverty-stricken nations! After all, the World Bank has practically become the intellectual power house which sets the “agenda for African development,” (Herbst, 1992: 17). As for the United States, there is increasing recognition of the fact that it is “contributing relatively little to new thinking in Africa, being largely content to piggy-back on the World Bank’s thinking,” (Herbst 1992: 17).