Imperialism and the Democratization Process in Africa

In spite of the dismantling of economic restrictions in virtually every African state to please the IMF, World Bank and donors, “the foreign direct investment response has been at best, hesitant and weak in Africa,” (Sirleaf 1994: 9). Many African ambassadors in Washington D.C. go about with long lists of companies, previously owned or subsidized by the government which are up for privatization. How many buyers have shown up, even when they are made available at give away prices? Yet, compare with the rush of companies from fast food to construction to Eastern Europe (which is actually more unstable and more unpredictable than Africa), the establishment of countless scholarships, fellowships, and academic and research programs on Eastern Europe within a few years. The truth and reality is that the West is NOT interested in the development of Africa and it is not interested in genuine democracy in Africa. In terms of direct foreign investment, Sirleaf (1994: 9) shows that “In Africa, where the need is perhaps greatest, the trend has been dismal. According to (the) UN…, the annual average flow of foreign direct investment to Africa over the 1985-89 period was $2.6 billion. The corresponding figures are $6.0 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean; $13.6 billion for East, South and South East Asia; $55.8 billion for North America and $60.8 billion for Western Europe.” Of the 93 third world nations listed in the World Bank’s World Development Report with populations over 2 million, “only 18 attracted direct foreign investment of eight dollars per capita or more during the 1986-90 period, all of them outside Africa,” (Sirleaf 1994: 9). Worse still, of the 23 nations in sub-Saharan Africa with populations above two million, ten had no direct foreign investments inflow whatsoever and “only six had inflows of more than two dollars per capita,” (Sirleaf 1994: 19).
With such minuscule support for growth, development and stability in Africa, the region’s devastated and marginalized economies are expected to perform miracles: to grow economically, increase productivity and trade, and to democratize. Procedural democracy in Africa has not solved any economic problems. The conditions of living in Zambia have actually worsened since the MMD government came to power in 1991. In Kenya where donors forced the government to liberalize the political landscape through direct pressures, “political paralysis, high rates of inflation, and insecurity have become the order of the day since the Moi government stole an election in December 1992,” (Mutua 1994: 16). Yet as Obasanjo (1994: 22) has warned, “Democracy and poverty are strange bed-fellows.” The point we wish to emphasize here is that the Western agenda does not contain any program to help new regimes consolidate and sustain democracy and to deepen it to levels where is can be self-sustaining. When it fails, it becomes very easy to point accusing fingers at African elites as incapable of doing anything right; and of being incapable of undertaking a “simple” project like democratization!
The Western agenda for political liberalization in Africa is creating big business in the West and confusion in Africa. By succeeding in reducing democracy to elections, it has generated its own market in election monitoring in Africa. To be sure, foreign monitoring of elections enable domestic opposition forces to compete openly. As well, it gives the election some global legitimacy, protects the opposition from the violence of the state, creates room for political education and training, and allows for the creation of independent local election monitoring bodies. However, as the experiences of Zambia, Ghana, and Nigeria clearly show, foreign election monitoring make little or no difference. But that is by the way. Who decreed that African elections can only be legitimate when it is monitored by westerners many of whom have little idea of the real stuff of politics in Africa? It is not simplistic to note that in spite of corruption (eg, the use of so-called “street money” in America) Africans do not come to monitor elections in the West. Many of the monitoring agencies disappear as soon as the elections are over thus puncturing the inflated confidence of local monitoring bodies. As well, because international legitimacy, foreign aid and investments are now directly and/or indirectly linked to the nature and conduct of elections as determined by foreign monitors, African pro-democracy movements and politicians now strive to listen to the monitors, take their advice, and strive to fit their politics into the model acceptable to the foreigners. This has been one of the major problems of the pro-democracy movements, many of which now see themselves as branches of USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Carter Center or some other foreign observer group. As Obasanjo (1994: 23) has noted: “The presence of international observers does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the legitimacy of the results, if all parties do not play according to the rules, and especially if the international community is not ready to enforce observance of the agreed terms of settlement and negotiations.” What was the purpose of monitoring the Nigerian elections in June 1993 if the monitors and their home governments would not defend the results of the monitored elections on a permanent basis? What have the monitors and their governments done since the ruthless General Abacha dismantled all the democratic institutions and has since November 1993 not only jailed the winner of that election but has embarked on a large scale abuse of human rights and criminal looting of the national treasury? How could the monitors pronounce the Ghanaian elections of 1992 as free and fair when it was clear that Rawlings not only manipulated the power of incumbency but also intimidated the opposition, divided them and hardly opened up the political space to genuine political competition. More importantly, the opposition (save for two minor fringe parties which teamed up with Rawlings’ party) boycotted the parliamentary elections and Rawlings went ahead with it any way thus producing a typical one party state in Ghana today.